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Colombia was selected as a theme in a Dutch lecture series called 'Forgotten conflicts'​[1]​. This revealed the way violence in Colombia is often silenced and lacks international media attention. The mainstream image appearing in newspapers, concerns the terrorist organization Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC). The FARC is weakening due to the highly praised Democratic Security Policy of Alvaro Uribe, former president of Colombia since 2002 and reelected in 2006. His popularity in the polls has seldom been lower than 70%. The polls are however not representative for the whole population. For example, Invamer-Gallup, Colombia's leading poll agency is based on interviews in the four largest cities of Colombia. Many people living in the rural areas in Colombia have little or no faith in Uribe.​[2]​ At the time of writing this thesis, former Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, won the elections and will continue the same line as Alvaro Uribe. It is forgotten that certain aspects of the Colombian conflict are far more complex, polarized and silenced than it appears in the mass media:

“Colombia is not only waging a war against society, but a war against the defenders of rights: labor leaders, human rights activists, community leaders, the indigenous, Afro-Colombians and peace defenders” (Rojas 2009: 234)

According to the government of Alvaro Uribe, however, there is no armed conflict in Colombia. From the government's point of view, the only threat to Colombia´s democracy is terrorism, caused by the FARC. 'In Colombia we have no insurgents against dictators....We have terrorists against democracy'​[3]​. The Defense and Democratic Security Policy (DDSP) consists of a description and justification of the most important policies of the government of Alvaro Uribe.​[4]​ Far more emphasis is put on security than on democracy. In the militarist discourse of Alvaro Uribe should 'terrorists' be eliminated with great efforts of the heroic soldiers of the Colombian army. The presence of these soldiers in every corner of Colombian society and the militarized policy of Alvaro Uribe is legitimized by the idea that the army would provide security and act according to international human rights law. Traveling through Colombia, one encounters huge signs saying: 'The national army is here to protect you, 200 years of honor and glory'. Not only soldiers are used in this fight against 'terrorism'. Citizens also get a vigilant function in programs such as 'network of collaborators and informers' and 'soldiers of my town', resulting in mistrust among the local population and the loss of solidarity and political organization (Rojas 2009:232-233).
From another point of view, the story of the peasants struggling for a living in the midst of a violent conflict is neglected or manipulated by the Colombian army and state officials. This is done in such a systematic way that a citizen of Medellin wondered why these peasants are being displaced so many times. As if there is no violence to flee for, no armed actors to fear. Not only at a national level do people feel mislead and manipulated, but also on the international level, the Colombian government seems to legitimize its actions by giving a completely different story about the Colombian conflict than the one that I encountered during three months of fieldwork in the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. 










Chapter 1: The research process

Problem statement and research questions

The Peace Community of San Josecito de Apartadó has no lack of solidarity and support from the international community. Several human rights NGOs such as Peace Brigades International (PBI) and Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) have been accompanying this community for many years, which provides the community with protection and enables them to continue their work under utmost complicated circumstances of armed conflict. Community members always keep on emphasizing how important and of vital interest this international support is for them. Without it, they say they would already have been eliminated by the armed groups present in the region.
	Despite this international attention, the Peace Community together with the NGOs that accompany it, have experienced systematic stigmatization by armed groups and state officials. Remarkably, this stigmatization is largely absent in the academic literature about the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. To fill this gap, this thesis will shed light on how this stigmatization, caused by the protracted violent conflict in Colombia and its climate of extreme polarization, is used as a strategy of war, but in an invisible 'non-violent' way. Furthermore this thesis explains how this stigmatization legitimizes the continuation of war and how it affects daily life and the counter-discourse of Peace Community members of San Josecito de Apartadó.
	On a more theoretical level, this thesis will explain the relevance and importance of bridging theories emphasizing the functions of violence with non-violent resistance theories by illustrating how violent and non-violent strategies are used in different ways by both victims and perpetrators. It will be argued that an analysis of the functions and consequences of political stigmatization is useful in order to be able to bridge these theories. These objectives are formulated in the following central question:  

How do the Peace Community members of San Josecito de Apartadó experience the stigmatization that they are part of or collaborate with the FARC? How does this stigmatization affect their everyday lives and coping mechanisms of non-violent resistance to violence? 

The following sub questions were phrased:

1.	How did Peace Community members manage to build and maintain a community that refuses to neither directly nor indirectly participate in the civil war, including the rejection of the presence of the armed forces of Colombia? What characteristics do Peace Community members have in common and how is their group identity constructed?
2.	How and to what extent is the Peace Community stigmatized by different actors (government, armed groups, mass media)? 
3.	What impact has stigmatization on the everyday lives of Peace Community members?
4.	How do Peace Community members cope with this stigmatization?
5.	Why is an analysis of political stigmatization of a non-violent community in a war zone useful to bridge the gap between theories emphasizing the functions of violence and non-violent resistance theories?
Methodology

Ethnographic fieldwork and 'disciplined subjectivity'








This thesis builds upon ethnographic fieldwork conducted during a period of three months from February 2010 until May 2010 in the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. I have chosen this community because it is one of the oldest and best known peace communities in Colombia. The first question that captured my interest was how they were able to sustain their survival strategies, despite the high levels of violence, selective assassinations of their leaders and systematic stigmatization. While many peace communities in Colombia have fallen apart or lack organizational strength due to these threats, San Josecito de Apartadó continues its resistance. 




The Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó is located in North-West Colombia in the region Urabá. Due to its richness in resources and many economic interests in the region it is a highly strategic area in which the different armed groups are present. The Peace Community is not a territorially bound community, which means that Peace Community members live in the same hamlets as people not belonging to the community. Furthermore, these community members live in different hamlets in a large jungle area in which it is not uncommon to walk an entire day in order to arrive at the next hamlet. I have lived three months in San Josecito, the hamlet that is only an hour jeep ride away from the nearest city Apartadó. Occasionally I made trips to other hamlets La Union, Mulatos, La Resbalosa and also visited some new hamlets in the province of Cordoba (Nain, Puerto Nuevo, Las Claras).​[6]​ Every hamlet has a democratically chosen leader that represents the Peace Community in the Internal Council. They meet weekly to discuss issues, to take decisions and to organize events. In chapter 4 the political organization of the Peace Community will be explained in more detail.   

Limitations and ethical dilemma's

The 'problem' of getting access





At the moment I arrived in San Josecito, almost all Peace Community members were in Mulatos participating in a meeting of the peasant university. It was set up to unite different peace- and indigenous communities in order to share ideas and experiences made in these civil resistance initiatives. When after an eight hour donkey ride I finally arrived at Mulatos, the meeting had unfortunately already finished. However, the next day some leaders asked me to join them to some other hamlets that recently had become part of the Peace Community. This resulted in a five day jungle tour in which I discovered many parts of the apparently 'peaceful' jungle, in which a war is being waged. I was very happy to be amidst some of my key-informants and to get to know them. At the same time I encountered quite some distrust and silence. Since NGO workers who accompany the community leaders did not participate in their meetings due to the neutral position they wanted to maintain. They would not interfere in the decision making process of the Peace Community. My foreigner status and this 'tradition' of NGOs to not participate in any meeting of course limited the possibilities to conduct participant observation. After some days I decided to ask if I could participate since I was not an NGO worker. One leader said it was fine, although the other one sent me away at the moment the meeting started. Obviously the relationship of trust had not yet developed well enough. After some weeks I managed to participate in a meeting of the Internal Council with the human rights NGOs, but I had the impression a lot of sensitive topics were avoided because of my presence and that of the NGOs. I already noted a paradox that on the one hand they publicly denounced all the human rights abuses, threats and false accusations on their website, but on the other hand, not sharing all information with the international community was also a way of coping with the extremely complicated situation they had to face. This will be explained in detail in chapter 5. 
	Concerning participant observation, I encountered more limitations during the rest of my fieldwork period. Due to the presence and sometimes harassment of soldiers or paramilitaries, while the members of the Peace Community were working on their land, they kindly requested me not to participate in their activities. This had to do with past experiences in which international NGO workers had been accused of not being neutral and actively supporting the community by helping them with their daily activities. As a result I did accompany them a couple of times during their community work, every Thursday, because this made it possibility for me to observe the interaction between Peace Community members. This observation was often the only possibility, because it was not appropriate to begin informal conversations, since their work was always physically heavy, due to heat and long working hours. Nevertheless it was an important way to show my solidarity and to build trust by just 'being there'.  
	Another dilemma that I encountered during my fieldwork period was how to use sensitive information that NGO workers or other foreign people​[7]​ told me, who were in some way involved in the Peace Community. Afterwards they emphasized that I should not use this information for my thesis, since it could only harm the Peace Community more and increase the stigmatization. Therefore, I have chosen not to explicitly mention this sensitive information, but instead incorporate it in the analysis in a subtle and nuanced way that it will not harm Peace Community members. Furthermore, I chose to represent the perspective of the Peace Community members. The analysis is thus based on their interpretations and meanings about the Colombian conflict in order to give them a voice and to contribute to their survival strategies by bringing hidden war strategies of the Colombian army to the forefront and showing that these strategies are not always necessarily directly violent in nature, but still legitimize and instigate violence. This is a story which will probably cause controversy and resentment among Uribe supporters, but nevertheless needs to be told. 
Outline thesis

This thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter introduces the main argument of this thesis and continues to describe the research process, the methodology and the reflections on dilemma's I encountered during the fieldwork period. The second chapter deals with the theoretical framework. It introduces and defines key concepts, discusses the relevant academic debates and sheds light on the theoretical perspective from which the data will be analyzed. Chapter three will provide insight in the complex contextual dynamics of the Urabá region and the Colombian conflict in general. Chapter four describes in detail the principles, the ideology and the political system of the Peace Community, such as the functions of the Internal Council and the way conflicts are solved. Furthermore it will analyze the massacre of 2005 and the voluntarily displacement process that followed. These are important events in the history of the Peace Community which have had a lot of impact on the daily life of Peace Community members, as well as on the interaction with the Colombian government. Chapter five deals with the political stigmatization of the Peace Community. It analyzes a particular case of one deserted FARC commander who is now working for the Colombian army. This case is a concrete example of political stigmatization which has had severe consequences for the Peace Community. Furthermore this chapter gives insight in the coping mechanisms of Peace Community members such as community work, anti-capitalist ideology, youth meetings (internalization of Peace Community principles) and the autonomous education system. In chapter six, empirical data of chapter four and five and theoretical insights of chapter two are connected and their relevance is explained.






Chapter 2: Theoretical framework

There is a general tendency in conflict analysis to focus on the rational political and economic functions of violence. The question that is often discussed is 'why do people resort to violence?' Obviously this is a very important and valid question to ask in understanding contemporary violent conflict. Moreover, violence has certain functions and can be beneficial for certain groups in society, especially for the perpetrators and 'the powerful' (Keen, 2008). Relatively little analysis focuses on local forms of non-violent resistance, which has resulted in a neglect of the agency of those who live under harsh conditions and do not benefit from violence. It is therefore necessary to pay more attention to the question why most people choose not to resort to violence, despite the fact that they live in a very violent environment. These civilians are often labeled as excluded, passive victims who are relatively helpless to do anything about their situation, and there is an overemphasis on the agency of the powerful and the perpetrators of violence (Gilgan, 2001). Using Gilgan's framework for conflict analysis that focuses on non-violent resistance as well as on violence as a means of domination, non-violent resistance is explored as a rational, highly adaptable response to acts of domination' (Gilgan 2001:1). At the same time this thesis will point to some gaps and shortcomings in Gilgan´s framework.
	First the link between violence and non-violence will be explored in this theoretical framework. By mentioning Kalyvas selection bias, the importance of studying violence and non-violence together and the interrelatedness of these concepts will become clear. Furthermore, based on Gilgan, I will argue the importance of a renewed analytic framework to study non-violent resistance. This framework builds on elements that are present in rationality theories for studying violence, including Keen's ideas about functions and rationality of violence as opposed to 'chaos theories' and mainstream perceptions that assume that violence is an irrational act, driven by emotions (Gilgan 2001: 1-5, Kalyvas 2006:33). 
	Second, this theoretical framework will deal with the different key concepts that exist in the field of non-violent resistance. The concepts of power and rationality will be conceptualized and discussed in order to gain a better understanding of non-violent resistance. Then it will elaborate on political stigmatization, which is directly related to both violence and non-violent resistance in Colombia, but which is only marginally mentioned in the literature about non-violent resistance. I will argue that the concept of political stigmatization can serve as a bridge between theories emphasizing the functions of violence and non-violent resistance theories and add an important but understudied dimension to Gilgan's analytic framework.

The interrelatedness of violence and non-violence

Simply defined, non-violence could be considered as the opposite of violence, a rejection of  violence in all its forms.. As Lipsitz and Kritzer argue: “In seeking to understand why one form of action works and how it works, one may find it extremely valuable to examine the other phenomenon” (Lipsitz and Kritzer 1975:731). Therefore, if non-violence is defined as a rejection of violence, it is first of all necessary to know what violence is. Violence is however a very ambiguous and complex concept. It is unclear what is considered to be a violent act, because it is a ‘slippery’ concept. Is it only physical injury? But what about economic violence, environmental degradation or structural violence such as poverty, racism, hunger and displacement, which often remains invisible and are considered to be ‘normal’? (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois 2004:2). Violence is never just ‘brute’ force, but a human condition which produces multiple meanings, and as a result violence is not ‘senseless’ either. Following Scheper-Hughes, Bourgois, Hastrup and other anthropologists who study violence, this thesis considers violence as a socially constructed concept, which cannot be understood in physical terms only. It belongs instead to the domain of intersubjectivity (Hastrup 2003:314). This is due to the fact that cultures, structures, ideas and ideologies shape all dimensions of violence (Scheper-Hughes 2004:3). Moreover the social and cultural meaning of violence and its ambiguous nature should be a central point for analysis. Some forms of violence are interpreted as legitimate, others are not, depending on cultural assumptions about how and why it occurred. In other words there exist multiple definitions and meanings of violence. 
In spite of the complexity of violence, scholars have tried to classify the concept. The most common classification that is used is a differentiation between direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence as introduced by Galtung. Direct violence causes direct physical harm and refers to killings, kidnapping and torture. Structural violence refers to indirect violence caused by unequal structures in society. Examples of structural violence are hunger or poverty. Cultural violence refers to elements in for example ideology, religion, science, art or symbols that serve to legitimate direct and structural violence (Galtung 1990: 291-305, Lopéz Martinez 2005:218). It is, however, too simplistic to simply define non-violence as a rejection of violence, since both concepts are in an ambiguous and complex way interrelated. How can two apparently oppositional concepts be interrelated? First because there is a lot of interaction between violent and non-violent actors and second because violent and non-violent actors use similar discourses to legitimate their actions. As Kalyvas argues: 'Instances of violence cannot be considered independently of instances where violence does not occur' (Kalyvas 2006:48). In other words, the artificial separation between violence and non-violence, ignores the similarities and interaction between violence and non-violence. Both violence and non-violence are in this thesis interpreted as rational and functional phenomena. Nevertheless, research on civil war, especially micro-oriented studies have a tendency to focus more on the most obvious violent events and fail to address more limited and complex violent acts or non-violence that are often less visible (Kalyvas 2006: 21, 48). This is what Kalyvas calls the 'selection bias' (ibid:48). For example in the context of the peace communities in Colombia, on the one hand, violent and non-violent acts and discourses constantly alternate and interact, so it would be one-sided to study non-violence without taking into account 'the logic of violence'. The same holds true for analyzing violence without addressing non-violent resistance, which is an incomplete and biased analysis, because the latter often results in putting the emphasis on the perpetrator of violence and ignoring the agency of the victims. In other words, the interaction between the different violent and non-violent actors is overlooked (Gilgan 2001:2, Kalyvas 2006:48). Since the literature on violence and non-violence is largely separated, the aim here is to connect concepts of both fields in order to develop a renewed contextual analytic framework to study non-violent resistance in a violent context.  

Non-violent resistance: Power and rationality

This thesis opposes the image of (non-)violence as an irrational act. According to Sharp, one of the founding fathers of non-violent resistance theories, non-violent action is a process of withdrawing consent. In other words, it is a choice, a decision people consciously take and thus a rational act (Sharp 1980:23-30). Non-violent resistance, however, consists of more than only withdrawing consent. Here, non-violent resistance is understood as:
“a behavior that includes endurance of violence and oppression, while creating alternatives and hindrance, as well as new definitions and evasion of both subordination and violence – in an attempt to undermine power and the legitimacy of violence, and creates conditions of reconciliation and dialogue” (Vinthagen 2005:19).

The above definition of non-violent resistance already includes violence, which illustrates the inter-relatedness of violence and non-violence. The challenge remains to bridge theories emphasizing the functions of violence with theories of non-violent resistance. This is the main argument of this chapter and builds on the 'rationality of resistance approach', developed by Gilgan (2001). The two concepts of power and rationality, understood from a structurationist point of view, are a useful starting point to bridge the gap. A structurationist perspective, as developed by Giddens, takes into account both the agency of individual actors and larger structures present in society such as institutions (for example education or marriage) and ideologies (for example capitalism or communism) (Giddens 1984:25). Gilgan is one of the few academics who made an attempt to bridge theories emphasizing the functions of violence with theories of non-violent resistance, by explaining power and rationality as two key concepts in her analysis. In doing so, she broadens the scope of analysis beyond the considerations of the benefits of violence.   
	Gilgan considers rationality as both enabling and problematic, depending on how it is used and defined. A focus on rationality is an important step forward compared to 'chaos theories' that assume violence is irrational, driven by emotions and thus results in chaos and anarchy (Kaplan 1994). Theories emphasizing the functions and rationality of violence see those who participate and witness violence in their everyday lives as agents, who to a certain extent are able to control their own lives and to act or participate in non-violent resistance. David Keen, who wrote extensively on rationality theories, is one of the major critics of the chaos theories. He focuses his analysis on the functions of violence for the perpetrators, but little attention goes to the rationality and agency of non-violent actors. Gilgan argues that rationality can be problematic if “the specific concept of rationality employed has the effect of reinvigorating the perceived agency of some at the expense of others”(Gilgan 2000:4). Gilgan refers here to the risk of the marginalization of specific groups such as those who live in a violent context but do not benefit from violence. 
	Besides rationality as a central concept for analysis of non-violent resistance, the meaning of power will be elaborated here. Dominance, violence and coercion are not characteristics of power in the non-violent tradition. Instead, power is explained as cooperative subordination (obedience) and originates from below, according to non-violent activists (Sharp 1973: 7-62). Subordination creates power, obedience and (in)voluntarily cooperation expresses power. In other words, power is perceived as consent by most non-violent movements. The counter-power of resistance becomes a form of non-cooperation with power systems (Vinthagen 2005: 4-5). 
 	According to Gilgan, non-violent resistance is a response to acts of domination which implies that the interrelatedness between violence and non-violent resistance can only be understood if power relations are taken into account in their entirety (Gilgan 2000: 2). In other words, power is not that clear cut: It is not something that perpetrators of violence 'have' and victims of violence 'do not have'. Everyone has both superiors and subordinates and both individuals and structures or institutions influence the distribution of power (Martin 1989: 216-218). This structurationist view on power is also reflected in Foucault’s ideas that power is omnipresent, relational and intentional. 'Power can increase without diminishing somewhere else' (Vinthagen 2005: 9) It is neither an institution nor a structure and it is not ‘owned’ by a particular group or class. 
Rather, it is a complex strategic situation, which involves multiple power relations and tactical usages of discourses (Smart 1985: 77). This means that individuals do not exercise power, but that power manifests itself through the individual and through structures. Power is therefore partly incorporated in the mind, language, and behavior of the individual and is constantly reproduced (Foucault 1980:180, Vinthagen 2005:10). 
	Related to these meanings of power, non-violent resistance can be categorized in different types. These are not mutually exclusive but can complement each other. A first type of non-violent resistance that is distinguished by Vinthagen is a communicative attempt of convincing, for example through appeals, witness, reinterpretations, information or symbolic counteracts. This type of resistance communications is about deconstructing the propaganda and ideology of power and breaking the rules of hegemonic discourse. A second type is 'the creation of competing and alternative patterns of relations and interactions'. Often this implies the production of parallel cultural, economic or political institutions to create space for a new order. A third type is based on the Gandhian notion of non-cooperation with the oppressive system and at the same time cooperation with every human being as part of the unity of humanity. For example to ally sub-groups within the 'enemy camp' with non-violent resistance, aims at undermining enemy images and discourses (Vinthagen 2005: 15-16). The third type refers to the interrelatedness of violence and non-violence. In order to understand why the third type of non-violent resistance is not always possible or desirable, another concept needs to be incorporated in the analysis: Political stigmatization, that is not mentioned in the literature about non-violent resistance or in the rationality of resistance approach developed by Gilgan. 

The missing link: political stigmatization

Stigmatization is defined in many different ways, depending on the focus of the research and the field of study. Research on stigma is particularly prevalent in social psychology, but the concept is criticized for being too individually focused: The power dimension would be lacking and it would be often vaguely defined (Link & Phelan 2001: 363). As argued before, because power is a crucial aspect of both violent and non-violent resistance theories, I will use the definition of stigmatization elaborated by Link and Phelan: “the co-occurence of its components - labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination - and further indicate that for stigmatization to occur, power must be exercised” (Link & Phelan 2001:382). Furthermore stigmatization is perceived as interpersonal and relational in nature, because stigmatization takes place both outside and inside a person, in the inter-subjective space between people. Stigmatization occurs at the level of words, gestures, meanings and feelings. It threatens what matters most or what is most at stake, and profoundly affects values in everyday life (Yang, Kleinman et al. 2007:1532-1534).  
	 Particularly in the context of Colombia, stigmatization is a complex phenomenon, because it is a non-violent strategy that paradoxically legitimizes violence. In Colombia, stigmatization is adopted by both perpetrators of violence, such as the Colombian army, as well as by state officials to legitimate a militaristic solution to the Colombian conflict and the destruction or silencing of non-violent peace initiatives. In the context of Colombia, stigmatization needs to be incorporated in theories emphasizing the functions of violence because it is used by the powerful actors in society to weaken opposition. It should also be linked to non-violent resistance because this is perceived as a threat by the oppressors, since it might undermine their power. Furthermore stigmatization is used to legitimate the continuation of war and this not only weakens non-violent resistance movements and communities but is also an attempt to eliminate them in a supposedly  'legitimate' way since it is a non-violent strategy, but instigates ultimately and indirectly the use of violence. 




This chapter argues that the introduction of the concept political stigmatization points to the ambiguous lines that separate violence from non-violence. Although violence and non-violence may seem oppositional at first, one discovers that violence and non-violence can be interpreted as parts of a single phenomenon. Indeed the act of political stigmatization itself is non-violent, but can be perceived as an instigator of violence. Gilgan made an attempt to relate theories emphasizing the functions of violence and non-violent resistance theories, but did not incorporate implications of non-violent resistance such as stigmatization in his analysis. Consequently, the interrelatedness of violence and non-violence is not sufficiently elaborated. 


















Chapter three: Historical context of the Urabá region

The region of Urabá in which the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó is located, has been a conflict prone area for many decades due to its fertile grounds and richness in resources such as minerals, water and oil. Furthermore, Urabá connects South-America with Central America with access to both the Caribbean sea and the Pacific. This strategic location offers the Colombian government, multinationals and armed groups many economic and strategic opportunities in the area (Tenthoff 2008:1). As a result it has been one of the most violent regions in the country, ruled by powerful landlords through privatized violence; it has a large and marginalized rural population (Rojas 2009:239). Historically Urabá has been a colonized, marginalized and excluded area with little state presence, except for the military. It has served as a refuge for armed actors in the civil war between liberals and conservatives in the twentieth century. With the emergence of the banana industry, radical unions, peasant organizations and the presence of different armed groups fighting for territorial control, Urabá was transformed into a scenery of war and displacement, especially in the eighties and nineties (Jaramillo et al. 2004:25). In other words, Urabá could be labeled a highly ambivalent region with many contradictions: A strong, but precarious region, full of opportunities and risks, characterized by a strong presence of social organizations and activists but also illegal armed groups that promote instability (Sarmiento 2007:9).  
	In order to understand the complex contextual dynamics of this region, this chapter will elaborate on these topics, such as the origins of displacement and the presence of armed actors and provides insights into the context in which the Peace Community members operate. First it will draw on some general dynamics of the Colombian armed conflict by showing its complexity, ambivalence and dirty war tactics that are being used. Second, it will zoom in on the region of Urabá and analyze the origins and presence of the different armed groups in the region. Finally it will illustrate how the interactions and interests of armed groups create an incentive for the stigmatization of human rights defenders and peace initiatives that promote neutrality and non-violence in Colombia and sketch the context of this phenomenon in a national setting.

General dynamics of Colombia's violent conflict

Although Colombia has the reputation of having a relatively wealthy, established democracy, multiple forms of violence have been disrupting the social order for decades (Tate 2007:31). As a response, a strong human rights culture and a variety of non-violent peace initiatives have arisen. The complexity of the Colombian armed conflict lies in the interaction between these multiple forms of both violence and non-violence. Paramilitaries have often been accused of having connections with conservative ‘state actors’. The guerrilla, on the other hand, is frequently associated with leftist NGOs and human right activists by state representatives and the army. Many variations and ambivalence exist within the different armed groups. It is not uncommon for guerrilla soldiers or commanders to demobilize from the guerrilla and to enter the Colombian army or the paramilitaries. As a consequence, the distinctions between the various violent actors have become blurred (Jimeno 2001:222). 




The civilian population in Colombia, especially the people living in rural areas are, as a rule, accused of collaborating with the enemy. In the eyes of the perpetrators, this is reason enough to destroy farms and fields, to threat innocent peasants, to rob them of their cattle and their few belongings, to install road blockades and checkpoints, to torture, to selectively assassinate social leaders and to perpetrate massacres of whole communities. The most visible consequence of these dirty war tactics is the massive displacement of approximately 3.5 million Colombians (Braun 2009:461). Less visible are consequences such as the destruction of individual families and of the social cohesion of communities as a whole and the social and political organization that existed there. Rumors about atrocities and the rigid distinction between enemy and friend create spaces of fear, terror and death in which people do not trust one another, since everyone can be an informant or spy (ibid).  

Characteristics and representations of Urabá

Urabá always has been a region of colonization. In the city Apartadó, only seventeen years after it was founded, already 70 percent of the total population were migrants. From the nineteenth century on, people from the coast, Cartagena and the province of Bolivar settled in Urabá. From 1950 the banana industry and employment opportunities also attracted people from neighboring provinces. Therefore, the colonization process of Urabá is a heterogeneous process that is not new, but has continued for many decades and which brought many different ethnicities to Urabá (Sarmiento 2008:21-41). 
	As a result Urabá can be seen as a refuge area for Colombians who wanted to escape poverty, or for people who were persecuted in some way. Both poor people and wealthy investors came to Urabá. There were more 'opportunities' in Urabá to enter the drugs business or other illegal activities such as traffic of arms or political revolutionary activities. Urabá became known as an area of refuge and secrecy in which violence was the principal way to solve conflicts, which strengthened private justice mechanisms and contributed to processes of social exclusion; these are still dominant in Urabá today. Urabá can be seen as a region of adventure, escape, luck and money, but also of danger, violence and death (ibid:42).


Guerrilla presence in Urabá

Guerrilla presence in Urabá dates back from the early nineteen sixties and was formed out of the liberal and communist peasant self defense groups that fought during the civil war La Violencia (1946-1963) to defend themselves against attacks of the army and the landowners (Braun 2009:460). There were two main guerrilla organizations, both playing an important role in the Urabá region. The FARC was founded in 1964 an had close links to the Colombian Communist Party. This revolutionary movement aims at a radical transformation of Colombia's capitalist system through collective action and armed struggle (Brittain 2010:1). Instead of the defensive strategy of the self-defense groups, the FARC was characterized by its offensive strategy, attacks on landowners, kidnapping and extortion of money (Braun 2009:460). The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) was founded in 1967 by a Maoist splinter group (Sarmiento 2008:131, Chomsky 2007:92). Urban intellectuals played an important role in its foundation (Braun 2009:460). This guerrilla activism was fueled by the harsh and exploitive working conditions on the banana plantations. On a small scale, labor organizing started to increase with the support of Communist Party sympathizers, the FARC and EPL. During the first two decades of banana production unions were violently repressed, for example by arbitrary detention of workers and assassination of union leaders by the Colombian military. On the one hand, guerrilla activity increased this official repression, but on the other hand banana companies were forced to accept unions and collective bargaining in the region (Chomsky 2007:92-98). 
	In the nineteen eighties the Colombian government started a peace process with both guerrilla groups which led to a peace agreement in May 1984. Participants of the armed left were encouraged to demobilize and received amnesty if they did so. A result of these peace negotiations was the emergence of a new unarmed leftist party, the Patriotic Union (Union Patriotica). In Urabá, however, the peace process only strengthened guerrilla presence and contributed to the competition between the two guerrilla groups, partly caused by the highly militarized Urabá region which could not maintain the national truce with the guerrillas. A union war started in which the two guerrilla groups divided the unions in 'FARC farms' and 'EPL farms', fighting for workers' loyalties and territorial control (Ibid:98-101). 




Towards legitimization of paramilitarism 

The paramilitaries consist of a range of different self-defense groups that all have different origins,  but they are to some extent linked to military forces in counter-insurgency operations (Tate 2007:50). The paramilitaries first operated in well-developed, prosperous regions of large landholding agribusiness, mining and industry as a reaction to the guerrillas' activities and the inability of the military to stop them. Later on, they moved to zones controlled by the FARC and EPL (Braun 2009:460). Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, several laws have facilitated the emergence of private armies to protect landowners, cattle ranchers and officials. Decree 3398 in 1965 permitted for example the formation of security forces and formed a starting point in the legitimization of paramilitarism (Brittain 2010:116). Only in 1989 when crimes committed by self-defence group became more serious and widespread, paramilitary groups were declared illegal by Decree 1194 (Burbidge 2008:560-561). This however, did not stop them from committing crimes and organizing themselves nationally. This legislation was reformulated in 1991 which allowed private paramilitary forces again to confront the 'terrorist' organization FARC in particular. In 1997 the paramilitaries formed a national organization, called the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) ‘with the professional aim of defeating the guerrilla’ (Rozema 2008:429). In the political and socio-economic sphere paramilitaries won influence also. In 2002, various commanders of the AUC declared publicly that they controlled 35% of the national parliament, while the social-political and economic control in regions such as Urabá and the Atlantic Coast was even almost 100% (Tenthoff 2008:3). 

'The paramilitaries infiltrated state agencies, including the Colombian Intelligence Agency (DAS), the Institute for Rural Development (INCODER) and the army. They also created their own foundations and co-operatives and even participated in projects of agrarian reform' (Rojas 2009:235). 

National companies of wood and palm oil and multinationals such as Coca-Cola and Chiquita have all benefited from this paramilitary control and are still involved in judicial proceedings about their supposed links to paramilitary groups in Urabá (Tenthoff 2008:3). 
	The former president of Colombia, Alvaro Uribe Vélez, was a senator for the department of Antioquia (which partly belongs to the region of Urabá) from 1986 till 1994 and was governor from 1995 to 1997; during that time he gained a reputation as hardliner. Some even called him a 'paramilitary president', including one of my informants, an important leader of the Peace Community. Alvaro Uribe supported the CONVIVIR, a nationalized civilian-military force that displaced 200.000 peasants in the region of Urabá (Britain 2010:117, Rojas 2009:229). According to the promoters of CONVIVIR, these so called Rural Vigilance Cooperatives were created to provide the Colombian military with intelligence information. In reality CONVIVIR created private armies, funded and armed by the state; many of them were responsible for a dramatic increase in  massacres, (forced) disappearances, forced displacement and 'social cleansing' operations. In violation of international humanitarian law, the CONVIVIR made civilians both potential victims and victimizers in the conflict' (Britain 2010:117). As a result they were finally outlawed in 1999, but paramilitarism was not really restricted or dismantled, since many former CONVIVIR civilians joined already existing paramilitary networks throughout the country (ibid:118). 
	From 2003 on, the government of Alvaro Uribe has initiated a demobilization process. Many of the paramilitary groups officially do not exist anymore, because they have, according to the government, handed over their weapons. But in many regions paramilitary structures remain active and 'they continue to have close relationships with the economic elites, whose interests they not only defend, but in most instances actively promote' (Braun 2009:461).
	Especially in Urabá, the link between violence perpetrated by the paramilitaries and the interest of national economic 'development' is evident. It is not surprising that Urabá is one of priority regions in the National Development Plan (PND) of the government of Alvaro Uribe (Tenthoff 2009:2). Accion Social, a governmental organization 'of social action and international cooperation', is responsible for the implementation of economic and social development projects in Colombia and is funded by USAID and other multilateral development agencies as well as through bilateral development funding. One of the programs of Accion Social is proyectos productivos, which is part of the program against illicit crops that aims at eradication of illicit corps and alternative development. Accion Social has developed three criteria in order to be able to choose a region in which the program Proyectos Productivos will be implemented. First, the regions need to be included in the agricultural frontier of the country, defined by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. Second is the necessity to strengthen developmental processes with other investments. Third, the production process should take the necessities of the market as a starting point. It is evident that these criteria favor business and entrepreneurs interests that aim at strengthening agro industries. They fail to take into account the needs of the recipient population. This means that in reality, the implementation of this program results in benefiting the economic interests of the government which are linked to paramilitarism (Tenthoff 2008:7-11). 
	Social organizations, unions, leftist political parties and different insurgent groups cause hindrances for the converged economic interests of landowners, drugs traffickers and the Colombian state (ibid 2008:2).  

Context of peace movement in Colombia: history of stigmatization of human rights defenders and political opposition

Garcia Durán states that there exists considerable polarization in the peace movement in Colombia. Some consider the use of guerrilla violence as legitimate, while others reject it and only advocate peace through non-violent resistance. “In Colombia, making a claim for peace does not necessarily mean that someone is defending a non-violent perspective” (Garcia-Durán 2006:2). Obviously this has increased the mistrust in of the Colombian army and state officials as to all peace initiatives and human rights defenders in Colombia. From the government's point of view, non-violent peace initiatives are an attempt to subvert the legitimacy of the Colombian army. They see themselves as the victims of extreme left guerrilla sympathizers who are involved in a slander campaign to discredit the Colombian army and to legitimize guerrilla presence (Vargas 2006:45). Besides the economic interests, this has been a reason for the Colombian army and state officials to stigmatize human rights defenders and any form of political opposition.
	A clear historical example of the intolerance towards any form of political opposition and the extreme reactions this provokes is the often called political genocide of a leftist political party, the Patriotic Union, Union Patriotica (UP) in the 1980s. This leftist political party has played a significant role in Colombian political culture; civilians gathered here for change through non-violent means (Britain 2010:206). There exist, however, many misconceptions about the legitimacy of the UP. Many people associate the UP directly with the FARC as being a political arm of this guerrilla organization. Furthermore the UP is consequently demonized by right wing groups, with a clear purpose that benefits those who saw the UP as a threat to the existing power divisions in Colombia.

'From an ideological and strategic position it became beneficial for some to associate political activism with armed struggle, as it meant that a large number of individuals, and the organizations with which they were associated, could not be considered legitimate democratic participants' (Britain 2010:210).

The UP became an official state-sanctioned party in 1985. Since 1986 6000 members of the UP have been assassinated. However, many scholars from different backgrounds and with different analyses of the civil war in Colombia share a similar point of view about the UP. It was considered a legitimate political party, without a militant doctrine, that sought a peaceful path to political change. Despite the fact that the party had some former guerrilla's as members and had indirect associations with the FARC, the vast majority of UP members were civilians and didn't have any connection to the guerrillas (ibid:206-211). The repression and political genocide of the UP ultimately instigated just more violence in Colombia, as the elimination of the UP was proof for the FARC that arms are necessary to transform the capitalist system in Colombia. Consequently some supporters of the UP became more radical and felt they now had to support the FARC, since there were no non-violent alternatives anymore (ibid:210). 




The aim of this chapter was to contextualize the violence and stigmatization the Peace Community has to cope with. It stressed the complexity of the Colombian conflict that is reflected in the interaction between multiple forms of both violence and non-violence. Furthermore it argued that the label of a new war is not appropriate in the case of Colombia, because it would deny the socio-political struggle that has caused a fragmentation of society and normalization of violence. 
	More specifically the way the region Urabá is represented by Colombian scholars was highlighted. Historically, Urabá could be considered as a militarized region in which the principal means to solve conflicts was violence. Exploitative working conditions provoked guerrilla activism and strong unions, in which both violence and non-violent actors participated. In the nineties these were oppressed by paramilitary violence that was legitimized by several laws in the name of 'protection' of powerful landowners, cattle ranchers and officials. This also revealed the corruption of the Colombian judicial and political system, especially in Urabá in which the socio-political and economic control of paramilitaries was almost 100% in 2002. Connections between paramilitaries and a variety of Colombian state agencies such as the army, the intelligence agency and local municipalities and multinationals were widespread.





Chapter 4: The rejection of violence and the creation of an alternative way of life

In Urabá paramilitary violence increased dramatically during the nineties. As a result, most people living in the area of San Josecito de Apartadó have been displaced to the slums of Medellin or other nearby cities. Some were forced to do so, because they would otherwise get killed. Others fled out of fear and rumors they heard about atrocities committed by paramilitaries (Jaramillo et al 2004:3-15).
	Why would a minority of the peasants living in Urabá, looking for a peaceful solution of the violent conflict, decide to stay in the midst of a civil war in which violence has been normalized for decades? One of the founding fathers of the Peace Community once explained to me: they have never experienced any form of social investment from the government. During the past 35 years they just experienced coercive power, arms, violent repression, threats, torture and assassinations: “More than anyone do we, the civilians, live in the midst of armed confrontations. When there is war, everything is a lie; the only thing that is being done is the justification of war”​[8]​.




Displacement, massacres and government dialogue

What these Peace Community members have in common in the first place, is the fact that they all have been displaced several times due to the extreme level of violence in the region. They lost family members, children, shelter, animals, clothes, orientation and stability. One of my female informants described the experience of displacement:

“We slept for 3 or 4 days and then we had to run for 3 or 4 days because the army came. All the time we were living in Mulatos, we had to flee in every possible direction. They were bombing, we had to run, leave everything we had, sleep in the jungle without carpet, without anything.”'​[9]​

In 1996 they were tired of violence and not willing to leave their lands anymore. Peasants who lived in the different hamlets surrounding San Josecito de Apartadó and were able to flee the violence and make it to San José, started the civil resistance protest and the idea of creating a neutral community with support of the NGO Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission (CIJP), an internationally renowned human rights organization. This rational choice to stay in the middle of armed confrontation was obviously accompanied with a lot of sadness, hunger and desolation. Their children gave them strength to resist the violence and claim the right to stay on their lands (Noche y Niebla 2005:16). After many workshops and discussions about how to implement this idea of a neutral community, the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó signed the declaration on the 23 of March 1997.​[10]​ The Colombian army and paramilitaries, but also the guerrilla immediately responded with repression, threats, assassinations, massacres and roadblocks. This has continued for many years (ibid). According to the Peace Community members, the armed groups reacted in such an extreme way because the neutrality principle of the Peace Community was perceived by the armed actors as nuisance. The Peace Community did not cooperate with any of the armed groups anymore. The aim of all the armed groups in the region is, however, to let the civil population cooperate with them to weaken 'the enemy'. These different perceptions and principles clashed and caused fear in the Colombian army as well. They perceived the Peace Community as an enemy, not only because their participants did not cooperate, but also because they had the power and international support to publicly denounce the massacres, roadblocks and links between paramilitaries and the Colombian army.  
	By zooming in on a particular violent event, a massacre that occurred in 2005, I will analyze the perceptions of the Peace Community members about the Colombian state. Among others, an important leader and one of the founding fathers of the Peace Community, was assassinated in this massacre. This leader, Luis Eduardo Guerra, played a crucial role in negotiations with state institutions. It is important to keep in mind that this massacre is only one out of so many cases of suffering, death and impunity the Peace Community has had to cope with. From 1997 till October 2005, 150 Peace Community members have been killed (Noche Y Niebla 2005:133).​[11]​ At the agricultural centre of the Peace Community one finds a list with names of all the Peace Community members that have been killed up to November 2009: 201 members in total.  
Generally speaking the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó has little confidence in the Colombian state institutions. Reason for this can be found in a high impunity rate (almost hundred percent), the participation of Colombian soldiers in massacres of Peace Community members and the systematic stigmatization they have experienced by state officials. Luis Eduardo Guerra was nevertheless in favor of a dialogue with the government and always emphasized the importance of mutual understanding.  He tried to convince the Colombian state of the fact that the Peace Community differed from the way state officials depicted the community.​[12]​ As a result of the efforts of Luis Eduardo Guerra to start a dialogue with the government, the Peace Community participated in several meetings with government institutions in 2004, such as the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Attorney General, Inspector General and the police. During these meetings they discussed the installation of a police station in San Josecito de Apartadó. The Peace Community did not agree with the establishment of a police station on their territory, since it would violate their principles of not allowing any armed actors on their territory. The police in Colombia is heavily armed and also participates in combats. Therefore the Peace Community proposed to locate the police station outside the urban center of San Josecito de Apartadó in order to avoid that the civil population that lived there got involved in combats. Even the head of the police cooperated and proposed that those policemen would take a course (taught by a Peace Community leader) about the Peace Community principles and ideas. Furthermore the Peace Community asked for monitoring of the police behavior by the head office in Bogotá and proposed to install an independent commission that mediated between the police and Peace Community members. State institutions promised to give a definite answer at the end of the year.​[13]​ Nothing happened until February 21, 2005 when Luis Eduardo Guerra was assassinated together with his wife and eleven year old son near the Mulatos river. Five other Peace Community members were killed in this massacre as well, including two kids, one of eighteen months and one of five years old (Noche y Niebla 2005:94). The Peace Community was shocked and devastated and interpreted the massacre as a sign that the state was not interested in negotiating with the Peace Community at all. Consequently this caused a total disruption of the dialogue with the government. After the massacre Peace Community members were even more convinced of the fact that the Colombian state aimed at destruction of the community by purposely assassinating such an important leader that was one of the most willing persons to go into a dialogue with the government. 
	The first days after the massacre, no information about it appeared in newspapers or on the news. Silence in the media and uncertainty among the Peace Community members prevailed. A Peace Community member told me how difficult this period was:

“After five days of no information at all about what happened and how many people got killed, we still did not know anything. We only heard rumors that there were three dead people, or maybe five or eight. I was convinced that Luis Eduardo Guerra was hiding somewhere, scared but still alive.”​[14]​ 

In an attempt to take this uncertainty away, the Peace Community organized a delegation of about hundred people to search for the bodies. Together with international NGOs, Father Javier Giraldo, a human rights defender who is closely involved in the Peace Community process and many Peace Community members they searched for days under very harsh circumstances in the area of Mulatos. 
	On February 22, at the farm of Alfonso Bolivar, people from the surrounding region found graves containing several bodies, including those of children. The people who discovered this sent a couple of farmers to San Josecito de Apartadó to inform the Internal Council of the Peace Community about their discovery. At the same time, neighbors of the Bolivar family waited at the Bolivar farm for a Judicial Commission to begin its investigation. On February 23 the Corporacion Juridica Libertad (Corporation of Judicial Freedom) was informed about the massacre and immediately requested the Director of the Human Rights and International Law Program, Vice-President Carlos Franco, to install a criminal investigation team. The next day, on February 24, a commission (one federal official, one attorney and 10 judicial technicians) arrived in San Josecito de Apartadó. On February 25, helicopters from the Colombian Armed Forces with the investigation team finally arrived at the Bolivar farm. That afternoon they confirmed that five bodies were in the grave, including two children. However, Luis Eduardo Guerra, his wife and child were not identified, however​[15]​. In the meantime, on February 25, the delegation of the Peace Community found the body of Luis Eduardo Guerra with signs of torture and the dismembered bodies of his son and partner at another place near the Mulatos Medio Health center.​[16]​ This was immediately communicated to Dr. Franco. It took, however, until February 27 until the bodies were recovered by the judicial commission. In between the discovery of the body and the arrival of the judicial Commission, on February 26, the delegation of Peace Community members and international NGO workers encountered soldiers along the way who behaved aggressively and showed their power by actively destroying evidence of the massacre in front of many witnesses. A soldier picked up a bloody machete and washed it in the river and said: 'This was the decapitating machete'. ​[17]​ 
	After a few days of silence, the media started to report about what happened the 21st of February. The Peace Community denounced the paramilitaries in close cooperation with the military as the perpetrator of this massacre, while the military announced publicly on the national news that there was no military activity in the region not before and not during the massacre on the 21st of February. Survivors of the massacre affirmed, however, that they could prove soldiers of the Brigade 17 were involved in the perpetration of the massacre. An eyewitness stated that Luis Eduardo Guerra and his family were detained by uniformed soldiers. Workers at the Bolivar farm at the time saw the military approach.​[18]​ Furthermore there is evidence that army soldiers detained several families in their homes in El Barro, close to where Luis Eduardo Guerra and his family were killed. These families were threatened and intimidated by soldiers and not allowed to leave until February 27, when the community delegation arrived.​[19]​ These soldiers also told the residents that they had killed three guerrillas – a man, a woman and a child. The residents knew Luis Eduardo Guerra had just left El Barro, heading towards his cacao farm, so they told the soldiers they had killed members of the Peace Community. The soldiers responded that the paramilitaries had killed these people (Colorado 2008:15-21). The military did not consider these affirmations convincing. According to the general in charge, it corresponds with the way the military is traditionally falsely being accused of human rights abuses in this region, especially by the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó​[20]​. 
The government used the massacre to legitimate the installation of a police station in San Josecito de Apartadó in order to 'protect the civil population'. The government stated that Luis Eduardo was a member of the guerrilla and that the massacre was perpetrated by the guerrilla to prevent that Luis Eduardo Guerra would desert the guerrilla. According to the government, Peace Community members are in fact guerrilla spies who actively collaborate with the 5th front of the FARC​[21]​. This stigmatization will be analyzed in more detail in chapter five. A few days after the massacre, former President Alvaro Uribe publicly requested the police to install a police station in San Josecito de Apartadó. Also the military entered the area. The message of the government was clear: The Peace Community should unconditionally accept the presence of the police and the armed forces or else the Peace Community will cease to exist. Even the national ombudsman said the country should understand that there is no place in which the armed forces are not allowed to be. All state institutions legitimized the presence of the armed forces in San Josecito de Apartadó, while the Peace Community members experienced it as a threat and decided to leave San Josecito de Apartadó. 
	After a ten minutes walk downhill, one encounters a few hectares of private property, once donated by a Dutch cacao cooperation. The Peace Community members called the hamlet San Josecito or La Holandita (named after the Dutch cacao cooperation) and once again started from scratch, step by step constructing a new home. According to my informants this was a very difficult time in which they lived under very poor circumstances. There was no water, no electricity, no education, no healthcare, and many cases of malaria. The first nights they slept under plastic, while constructing houses and other facilities. Initially about fifty families moved from San José de Apartadó to San Josecito. Many families, however, were not able to cope with the difficult circumstances and decided to move elsewhere, accepting help of the state institution Accion social. A few families stayed in San Josecito de Apartadó, because they owned a shop or other small businesses in San José de Apartadó. Ultimately some thirty families stayed in San Josecito. Despite the fact that it was such a difficult time, just after the massacre in which Luis Eduardo Guerra was killed, the displacement process also has strengthened the Peace Community. Peace Community members felt like they had triumphed and showed the government of Alvaro Uribe they were able to continue their resistance in spite of the presence of the armed forces in the region. They felt constantly encouraged to continue their resistance by the belief: “The community does not consist of buildings, constructions, or territory, but the community consists of people, dignity and life”​[22]​. The Peace Community let the government know that it is willing to resume the dialogue under four conditions:
	That the president gives back the honor, dignity and good name of the community.
	That they withdraw the police station of San José de Apartadó and that they continue the dialogue about a better location for the police station
	That the government and the armed forces recognize and respect the humanitarian zones
	That they establish a justice evaluation commission​[23]​ 

For the Peace Community members these conditions are an absolute prerequisite for resuming negotiations and restore a minimum of confidence. Peace Community members told me they are afraid they will be fooled again, that the same lies will be told, the same strategies will be used to discredit the community. They are convinced the government will not comply to these four conditions. The fact that there is a lawsuit going on in which ten soldiers are being prosecuted for participation in the massacre of 2005, does not change this total lack of confidence. According to the Peace Community members, the legal proceeding is another strategy of the government to hide the serious impact of their actions. They are convinced that the massacre was planned by the Colombian state or 'the intellectuals', as they would call them, who govern the country. According to the Peace Community, accusing individual soldiers of low ranks, only obscures the responsibility of these intellectuals and allows them to continue their criminal activities. “They have the power to show a truth, the way they want ‘the truth’ to be like.”​[24]​ Despite the power of state officials and armed actors Peace Community members do strongly react against and resist these inequalities and injustice. They do so, for example, with the support of the provisional measures of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, which were reaffirmed by the Colombia's Constitutional Court in 2003 and thus binding to the Colombian government. These provisions require that the state protects members of the Peace Community and persons who provide service to the community. The means of protection should be consulted and agreed upon by the community.  According to the binding decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the Colombian state is not allowed to impose a military presence against the will of the community.​[25]​ 
	One reason for that the Peace Community still exists in the midst of violence, is the strong group identity they have constructed during these thirteen years of resistance. This strong group identity, the anti-state discourse and the support of the international community can be interpreted as their form of power. It can nevertheless be questioned whether this discourse is effective in finding a solution to the violent conflict, because it only widens the gap between victims and perpetrators. It is, however, difficult to draw a strict line between victims and perpetrators, because people can be both at the same time. The next paragraph will highlight other elements that constitute their group identity and explains how the group identity and use of anti-state discourse of the Peace Community widens the gap between the Peace Community and the Colombian Government.

Group identity of the Peace Community members

Identity is understood here as “constructed representations of the ‘self’ in relation to the ‘other’’ and are thus exclusionist in nature” (Jabri 1996:131).
Collectivity is one of the core ideas behind the organization of the Peace Community. During thirteen years of civil resistance they have created an alternative system in which they reject individualism and the capitalistic world 'outside'. They only think and act in 'we' instead of 'I'. From their point of view the capitalistic ideology only causes war, suffering and inequality. The individualistic ideology of capitalism has created a system of death, in which you can only survive with money, power and weapons:

“The Colombian state is part of a capitalistic system originating in the principle of injustice. Historically groups have committed crimes in different forms, impoverishing humanity more and more. They have a concentration of money that circulates around the world and where nobody is allowed to think differently; the one who does so is condemned to be killed. Because the Colombian state and especially Uribe's government is part of this system and therefore united with 'gringos' (westerners) who are the empire which ultimately promotes death in the world, by the things 'they' have done in the Middle East in the name of fighting terrorism or in Vietnam in the name of fighting communism. Actually they are searching for richness, oil, gold, everything they have taken, at the expense of millions of innocent people. In general, this is what happens. In every war it is like that.”​[26]​
      
The leader cited above, is convinced that all Western capitalist powers have to a certain extent collaborated with the Colombian government in search for money, resources and land. Referring to chapter three, which sheds light on the economic interests Western powers have in Colombia (countries like Spain, Holland, Germany and the United States), it is hard to deny that many multinationals in Colombia indirectly contribute to violence and armed confrontation, especially in Urabá. Many Peace Community leaders put emphasis on this unequal capitalistic world system in order to depict the contrast with their own alternative model of life as sharper and more convincing. Ultimately they want to show that it is possible to create an anti-capitalistic space in a region that is dominated by capitalism. This anti-capitalistic belief system is rooted in a strong peasant mentality in which pragmatism and community work is essential. The aim is to create an alternative economy based on solidarity and community work. On a practical level this means that the Peace Community is divided in working groups in which four of five members work daily to cultivate and produce crops like corn, cacao and bananas in order to provide food security for every single Peace Community member. Their collective property is cultivated by the different working groups. This is fundamental in a conflict zone, since Peace Community members cannot rely on 'the outside’ world to provide food and other basic needs. They have experienced long periods of paramilitary road blocks in which no product of any kind could pass through. At the same time they also produce for the market and export cacao and bananas to Europe. In other words, community work of the Peace Community contrasts with the private property which is owned by powerful landowners who cooperate with armed groups (Santamaría 2007:22). Besides this economic security it empowers Peace Community members: they feel less discriminated and marginalized for being peasants. Instead, they promote independence, autonomy and freedom and are proud of the alternative economic system they have created: “We have learnt that we, as peasants, are worth as much as anyone else. We have the same rights as anyone who went to the best university.”​[27]​




Informants often have said to me that in the Peace Community power does not exist. They associate power with the capitalist exploitative system which in their view is characterized by a process of inequality, dehumanization, destruction and death. The Peace Community has eight representatives or leaders who are members of the Internal Council. They are chosen democratically every six months. Decisions are generally taken by this Internal Council, but everyone has the right to be heard and to express his or her disagreement. In a sense, every Peace Community member is able to act as a leader: Since every Peace Community member can become a leader and a member of the Internal Council, everyone is equal. Being a member of the Internal Council, however, is not an easy job: few people are able and willing to dedicate themselves to it. Leaders have to sacrifice a lot when they are elected as members of the Internal Council. They travel between the different hamlets, have little time for their families and are burdened with many responsibilities. Functions of the Internal Council are, for example: to ensure that every Peace Community member adheres to principles such as neutrality, participation in working groups, refraining from consuming alcohol or carrying arms. Furthermore, the Internal Council monitors the provision of information or logistical support to any of the armed groups, in order to strengthen the process of civil resistance. Every leader has a specific task inside the Internal Council. For instance there is one legal representative and another who is in charge of the economic part. Leaders are very vulnerable to threats, because leaders of the Peace Community have been assassinated and put on death lists by armed actors. In other words, they put their life at stake for the sake of other Peace Community members. Although the Internal Council is the highest authority in the Peace Community, according to them power is not an incentive to become a leader. Instead, the incentive is strengthening the non-violent resistance process. Some leaders had a seat in the Internal Council for thirteen years, since they were re-elected over and over again, not because they are obliged to become a leader, however. They are allowed to reject the position or resign the Peace Community process at any moment. These leaders are charismatic, have a lot of experience (they have often worked with the communist party or unions as background) and enjoy a lot of respect. They are able to mobilize other Peace Community members to continue this civil resistance, and this could be labeled as a form of power. Peace Community members, though, would not define it this way. 
	Another central concept of the ideology of the Peace Community is consciousness. “If there is no consciousness, there is no civil resistance”.​[28]​ Consciousness can be understood as the mental disposition of choosing with awareness of consequences, on the basis of being thoroughly informed on a particular issue. The importance of this concept is reflected in the elections of the Internal Council members or in a general assembly where people can vote in favor for or against a certain decision. Peace Community members do not simply vote, but also have to explain why they voted for this person or why they are in favor of a certain decision. This mechanism helps to maintain a certain level of consciousness in the Peace Community.​[29]​ Moreover, everyone who wants to become a member of the Peace Community has to sign the declaration​[30]​ of the Peace Community in which all rules and principles are written down in several articles. To emphasize the importance and necessity of this consciousness to continue the civil resistance, the Internal Council requires that people know the content of the declaration and respect and live up the principles in a very active and participatory way. This means a lot of time is dedicated to explain the principles to the Peace Community members. Workshops and meetings in which everyone participates are regularly organized. One is encouraged to reflect on the development of the Peace Community process. New members get a trial period of one or two months to reflect on what it would be like to live in the Peace Community and to start to internalize the principles and decide whether he or she will be able to live in such a way. After this trial period they decide whether or not to sign the declaration and accept the principles of the Peace Community. At any moment one is free to resign and to leave the Peace Community without reprisals. It is a very dynamic process, in which people enter and leave the community (Noche y Niebla 2005:13-15). Reasons for leaving the community vary from family to family. Sometimes they leave because they are attracted by the idea of living in a city and because they have family members who can help them to start a new life there. Young people sometimes leave because they want to go to university or work in the city. Other reasons for leaving are problems or conflicts that occur in families or because members violate the neutrality principles of the community.​[31]​ This will be explained in more detail in the next paragraph. 

Obstacles in the Peace Community process

Despite the fact that the Peace Community has a strong group identity and clear perspectives, and ideas and principles on how to strengthen the civil resistance process in the midst of violence, internal problems and disagreements obviously still occur. As one young Peace Community member said: “We are human beings, everyone has his own thoughts, despite the fact there is a strong common ideology we all share.”​[32]​ There are, for example, conflicts in the family, between partners, jealousy, breakups or conflicts that occur because some Peace Community members are not used to working in groups. In communities in which values like equality, dignity and collectivity are so important, there is the risk of a free riders problem. Certain group members complain, for example, that they work harder or more than others, but that the latter still benefits from the equal distribution of goods. Or one is jealous, because one's neighbor has, say, more animals. Mostly, these are insignificant problems that do not cause much harm, in the sense that they do not weaken or influence the civil resistance process of the community. After all, these are universal problems that occur in every community. If they continue or worsen, however, the Internal Council will mediate or try to solve the problem and if this does not work out, people are requested to leave the community and to solve their problems elsewhere. 
	Due to the complicated situation the Peace Community members live in, more serious problems do also occur. For example, many people in the Peace Community have a brother, child or cousin who is a paramilitary, a guerrilla member or a soldier. This often implies that the risk of violating the neutrality principle increases. The Peace Community principles do not prohibit Peace Community members from having contact with these family members, but they are not allowed to give them food, accommodation or information. In other words, the contact is limited and these Peace Community members can only see their brother or child, who is involved in any of the armed groups, outside the Peace Community. This might create conflicts about loyalty. How to choose between a family member and the community? There have been a few cases in which Peace Community members violated this neutrality principle and did lodge guerrilla members inside the Peace Community.​[33]​ In such a case, the Internal Council immediately responds by imposing sanctions (such as excluding them for two months from the community or to let them do more community work). If members cease to violate the principle, they are allowed to stay, if not they are requested to leave the community. According to some members, it is difficult to expel them, because they sometime do not agree and stay regardless of what the Peace Community leaders said.​[34]​ Obviously this complicates and weakens the civil resistance process inside the Peace Community, especially in hamlets where people resigned the Peace Community process (because they have violated the neutrality principle) but still live as neighbors in the same hamlet in which the majority belongs to the Peace Community. In one case, everybody knows that there is a family with children who work for the paramilitaries. According to Father Javier Giraldo, these families have provided information about the Peace Community to their children which obviously puts the leaders of the Peace Community at a great risk of being killed, since these leaders are on paramilitary death lists for a long time and receive many threats. Unfortunately the Peace Community cannot expel them from the hamlet, because these families have lived in this area for a long time and due to land rights they cannot easily be expelled from their land. As a result, the Internal Council discussed the idea of moving all Peace Community members of this hamlet somewhere else, in order to avoid the problems these families cause.​[35]​ As a consequence of these complicated issues the Internal Council has become very careful in accepting new Peace Community members, even if they are family members of someone who already belongs to the Peace Community. The majority of the members, however, respect the principles of community, since they have voluntarily chosen to live under such conditions and act in a conscious and responsible way. 
	The only rule that is often violated is the prohibition of consuming alcohol. Peace Community members are not allowed to consume alcohol inside the Peace Community, since it increases aggression; in the past this has escalated dramatically​[36]​. Many youngsters live in the community who consider it difficult to live up to this rule. The Peace Community responds to this by organizing workshops of  'conscientization' in which they explain the consequences of consuming alcohol, and why it is important not to do so.   
	As described above, people voluntarily decide to join the Peace Community and accept the principles of non-violence and neutrality. Nevertheless people do change over the years, especially when living under such harsh conditions. Living in a Peace Community absolutely does not mean one can live a peaceful and simple life. Consequently, in a few exceptional cases Peace Community members (or even members of the Internal Council) voluntarily chose to resign the Peace Community process to join one of the armed groups:
 
“He was a member of the Internal Council and did a very good job. He was a very nice man and everybody loved him. Faced with all the losses and sufferings the community had to bear and despite all the denouncements, the military continued to kill people. As a result, he got caught up in a crisis and one day he said: I am going to join the guerrilla.”​[37]​ 

At the moment he began to develop sympathies for the guerrilla forces, he was excluded from the Internal Council and later resigned himself from the Peace Community. The Peace Community publicly announced that he no longer belonged to the community.






This chapter sheds light on the collective identity of the Peace Community that is characterized by a discourse of anti-capitalism, a strong emphasis on collective work, participation, freedom, a strict political system, a fixed set of community rules, and a discourse of distrust towards state institutions. 
	The collective identity is constructed rationally because the aim was to create an alternative way of life in the midst of armed confrontation. This is a highly rational choice, because fear, uncertainty and loss often have the result that people act emotionally, decide to leave and look for a more peaceful space to live. The Peace Community members, however, rationally made the decision to stay and consciously created an alternative, non-violent way of life to contrast it with the violence that continued outside the community. As a result of the continuous comparisons between life inside and outside the community in dichotomies such as life versus death, tolerance versus intolerance, equality versus inequality, the Peace Community developed a strong anti-state discourse which is characterized by distrust towards and rejection of negotiations with state institutions. In other words, this discourse of distrust towards state institutions and a strong us versus them thinking is part of the copings strategy of Peace Community members to deal with violence and stigmatization.
	In spite of this rationality, some contradictions can be found in the way the Peace Community presents itself. On the one hand do they promote freedom, equality and respect for people who think differently. On the other hand every Peace Community member has to adhere to rules that could be interpreted as strict, since they are not negotiable. Also the strong anti-state discourse that prevails in the Peace Community is not negotiable, due to the strong dichotomous distinctions between Peace Community members, armed groups and state representatives. In other words, considering the neutrality principle and perceptions about state institutions there is not much room for people who think differently. This is understandable, since neutrality is a highly sensitive topic in the context of the Peace Community. If people violate the Peace Community principles, the Peace Community is unable to maintain its organizational strength and would therefore cease to exist. On other topics such as religion there is obviously more room for different opinions. The negative perceptions towards state institutions, incorporated in the collective identity of the Peace Community, lead to a discourse of distrust. This in turn results in the rejection of any form of dialogue or negotiation with state institutions. A few exceptions such as Luis Eduardo Guerra, who was in favor of a government dialogue, were able to mobilize support for a more flexible attitude towards state institutions. His death confirmed the idea some Peace Community members already had, that leaders who were willing to negotiate and promote a softer or balanced attitude towards state institutions, were assassinated because the Colombian government did not respect this and maintains its enemy-discourse and 'us versus them' thinking that one often encounters in conflict areas. 




















Chapter 5: Stigmatization as a weapon of war

“In this community San Josecito de Apartadó, there are good people, but some of its leaders and advocates are known by people who have lived there, for helping the FARC and for using the community to support this terrorist organization.”​[38]​

This quote shows to what extent the Peace Community is being accused of collaborating with the guerrilla. If the president himself announces on national television that some Peace Community leaders are supporting the FARC, this obviously results in a negative public opinion about the Peace Community members of San Josecito de Apartadó. My informants are very aware of these statements and the consequences thereof for the Peace Community. 

“There is nothing more grave than the media. It is a form of destroying the image of 'the other', in this case a Peace Community. The media are a dangerous weapon […] they endanger the lives, integrity and security of Peace Community members.” ​[39]​

This chapter deals with this stigmatization of the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó and analyzes what consequences it has on their everyday life. Some examples of stigmatization will be illustrated and one particular case will be analyzed in more detail. This case about a former guerrilla commander shows to what extent stigmatization has an impact, on both a national and an international level. Finally, the coping mechanisms and survival strategies of Peace Community members in connection with this stigmatization will be discussed.

How a lack of justice fuels stigmatization 

“Colombia is notorious for its inability to hold human rights violators accountable for their atrocious crimes. Impunity prevails in this land where people are regularly threatened and the judiciary has no force” (Ahmad 2006:339). In the region of San Josecito de Apartadó, justice has been absent for more than thirty years. Human rights violations by the Colombian military were already taking place many years before the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó was established. In 1977 in the hamlet Mulatos (the same place where Luis Eduardo Guerra was assassinated), eight civilians were removed from their homes, tied to trees, tortured for eight days, and finally assassinated.​[40]​ The civil population living in Mulatos who witnessed these atrocities denounced the massacre that was perpetrated by the military and consequently fled their villages to avoid being murdered for denouncing the massacre. A judicial commission entered the region, listened to declarations of survivors and promised that justice would be done. After 1977 massacres occurred regularly, especially in the nineties. Violence increased dramatically after the formation of the Peace Community. Nevertheless, justice never came, not even after thirty years (Giraldo 2009:20). 
	Father Javier Giraldo has been observing and condemning this lack of justice for many years and argues that certain mechanisms explain this systematic impunity. He argues that it has to do with a lack of technical proof and profound contextual investigations. Furthermore, the search for testimonies in the camp of perpetrators themselves is problematic. In other words, the principle or strategy of only 'one testimony' allows for manipulation of testimonies which, as a result, leads to a judicial system that 'functions' without persecuting perpetrators of violence or combating corrupt institutions. According to Father Javier Giraldo, the judicial system suffers from a moral crisis, which the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó has revealed during its thirteen years of existence, precisely because it experienced systematic stigmatization ever since its beginning (ibid:20-22). Besides stigmatization being a legitimization of the violence against Peace Community leaders, it is also legitimized and made possible by this moral crisis of the judicial system. If the judicial system is functioning properly, state representatives can still use the media for stigmatization, but not the judicial system. This argument will be illustrated by a particular case about a former guerrilla commander who deserted from the FARC and began to work with battalion 17 of the Colombian military to organize a slander campaign against the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó, in exchange for receiving benefits, such as amnesty. According to the Colombian government, the statement of this deserted FARC commander is proof that the Peace Community would collaborate with the guerrilla, since he had 'worked' so many years in the region as a guerrilla commander. It was assumed he would be a liable source of information. According to the Peace Community members, this case is part of a larger government strategy to silence and ultimately eliminate human rights defenders or peace initiatives such as the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. This strategy is based on the assumption that human rights advocacy and Peace Community processes are intrinsically linked to subversive activity and consequently deny the legitimacy of human rights work (Hudson 2009:8). 

Case Samir: Two different images: a peace promoter or an assassin?

In the mass media in Colombia, there is only a limited amount of information about the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó and the well known Danis Daniel Sierra Martínez, alias Samir, a former FARC commander who now works for the Colombian military as a peace promoter (which in itself shows the paradoxical nature of this case).​[41]​ The image that appears of Samir in the media is that of a former FARC commander who was brave enough to escape the guerrilla to better his life and to dedicate himself to the cause of a peaceful Colombia. The government named him a gestor de paz (peace promoter), praises his efforts and is grateful for the information he gives about the FARC​[42]​. What the media do not mention, however, are the crimes he allegedly committed or ordered and the fact that he did not go through the different phases of the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) process. The first phase of this process consists of the surrender of former combatants, who have to present themselves at the Department of Justice or at the local / military authorities, after which the former combatants are handed over to the Department of Defense, where they are interrogated. They receive some benefits such as food, clothes and housing, while going through the judicial procedure. In case the combatant is charged with human right violations like kidnapping, murder or drugs trafficking, he is handed back to the court of justice. If he is free of charges, he receives official identity papers. The ex-combatant is then able to join the government reintegration program, without fear of being put to jail. In the second phase, former combatants enter into a special government program. They get support in terms of housing, monetary compensation, access to healthcare and psychological support. This phase takes about two years. After that, former combatants are supposed to be ‘reintegrated’ into civilian life (Pax Christi 2006:13-15).
	Samir received benefits from the government, as mentioned above, but was never prosecuted or interrogated about human rights violations he had allegedly committed. According to the Peace Community, Samir is responsible for the assassination of at least twenty Peace Community members in the late nineties and many more peasants who did not belong to the Peace Community.​[43]​ This suggests that he is not an objective witness, because of the benefits he received, which include amnesty, housing, a job as a 'peace manager' and money. His relationship with the Peace Community from the point of view of the members of that community is not mentioned either. Therefore, this paragraph will shed light on the perceptions of the Peace Community members of Samir and it will show in what way this contradicts with the official image that is presented in the media.
	In interviews with Peace Community members I was told that Samir did not respect the neutrality principle of the Peace Community and that he continued to demand Peace Community members to support him with food and other supplies. Moreover, he accused members of the Peace Community of being paramilitaries.​[44]​ “When he was a guerrilla commander, we were paramilitaries, and now that he works for the government, we are guerrillas.”​[45]​ Before he demobilized, he started to work with Juntas Comunales (organized peasant groups who do not belong to the Peace Community) to encourage them to accept government projects. As a result, people began to suspect that he might desert to the government side.​[46]​ In 2008 he indeed deserted and lived and worked at battalion 17, located in Carepa (a few kilometers from Apartadó), without being interrogated or prosecuted for his alleged human rights violations. However, demobilized combatants are subjected to the Justice and Peace Law. The essence of the Justice and Peace Law is that combatants who demobilize get a lower sentence of 5-8 years, which is considered to be a reward for their contribution to national peace, collaboration with the justice system and reintegration into society (Burbdidge 2008: 571). In theory, it should not be possible that demobilized combatants are not prosecuted at all if they are accused of having committed serious human rights violations, as happened in the case of Samir. In practice, however, there are many flaws in the Justice and Peace Law, which lead to a lot of controversy about the effectiveness of the demobilization process, since the structure of armed groups is still functioning and new groups are popping up. Many former combatants, including Samir, are 'recycled into the conflict' and continue to benefit from it in a supposedly 'legal' way because they now have the status of a peace promoter (ibid:68). This means that the main problem of the demobilization process is that it lacks social resonance and legitimacy in the eyes of the local people. For them it is just a facade that does not result in any structural changes, but only restructures elite pacts of governability and domination (Laplante & Theidon 2006:69). 
	Besides the fact that Samir was not subject to the official legal procedures, the discourse that he uses in the media is empty, contradictory and repetitious, according to the Peace Community members. One of my informants told me he that did not consider it worth listening to Samir anymore when he is on the local radio, because he repeats the same things over and over again such as the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó being an illegal organization that collaborates with the guerrilla.​[47]​ The Peace Community is, however, legally established based on International Human Rights Law and registered at the Chamber of Commerce. Furthermore, important human rights NGOs protect and support the community, such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Peace Brigades International. Also European governments financially support the community, including the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Moreover, they won the prestigious Aken Peace Price and were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007.​[48]​ This suggest that there are still many people and institutions, worldwide, that do believe that this non-violent resistance initiative is legitimate and should be supported and strengthened. Nevertheless and even though to a lesser extent than in Colombia, the stigmatization of the Peace Community reaches beyond the Colombian borders.
	Samir’s statements even caused controversy in the Netherlands, after a Dutch journalist had published an article in the magazine Vrij Nederland.​[49]​ This article suggested that the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs indirectly supported the FARC by financing NGOs such as Peace Brigades International, which protects Peace Community leaders with physical accompaniment. The journalist based the article almost entirely on an interview with Samir and only marginally incorporated the peace communities' point of view. Furthermore, it seems this journalist was not aware of the systematic stigmatization of human rights defenders and peace initiatives in Colombia, whereby it is common practice to use deserted guerrilla combatants as ‘witnesses’ in unfounded prosecutions of human rights defenders (Hudson 2009:1-63). Even before this article was published in Vrij Nederland, the Dutch embassy in Colombia discouraged the municipality of Barendrecht to establish a twinning town relation with the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó, because it would be politically controversial. This recommendation of the Dutch embassy provoked questions in the Dutch Parliament about the Peace Community. The former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, Maxime Verhagen, stated that it is not his responsibility to verify or proof whether there are links between the FARC and Peace Community leaders, but the responsibility of the Colombian justice system.​[50]​ He forgot to mention, however, that corruption in the Colombian justice system allows the Colombian military, in cooperation with paramilitary groups, to manipulate or prevent prosecution of human rights violations:
“Paramilitary groups, often working with military officers and soldiers, targeted human rights activists in retaliation for their investigations into specific crimes, to prevent the completion of investigations, and because of the widespread view that human rights activism was simply a facade for guerrilla supporters” (Tate 2007:155).
 
This quote implies that Maxime Verhagen cannot rely on the outcomes of investigations, because there is a risk that they are manipulated or hindered by the Colombian military or paramilitaries. In the case of alleged links between Peace Community leaders and the guerrilla, it would be beneficial to the Colombian military to have legal proof that there are connections between Peace Community leaders and the guerrilla. As a result, they would not hinder the investigations but try to make use of manipulated testimonies, as will be illustrated in more detail below. 




From the point of view of the Colombian government, the Peace Community and its supporters stigmatize and discredit the Colombian army by publishing false complaints at their website and by prohibiting the army to enter their territory. Father Javier Giraldo is seen as one of the instigators of a big slander campaign against the armed forces of Colombia. In April 2010, an arrest warrant was issued against Father Javier Giraldo. This was not the first time he was a victim of one of the false investigations against human rights defenders. In 2009 a military commander accused Father Javier Giraldo of slander and defamation of the armed forces of Colombia. After a while the case was closed, but Father Javier Giraldo remained stigmatized, at risk of an attack and seriously hampered in continuing his human rights work (Hudson 2009:17). Father Javier Giraldo responded by writing a letter to the Ministry of Justice, explaining his moral impediment to cooperate with the Colombian justice system (Giraldo 2009:1). The reasons for his moral impediment and lack of confidence in the Colombian justice system lie in the high impunity rate in Colombia and the neglect of the numerous petitions about the massacre in 2005, in which parts of the Colombian army participated. Father Javier Giraldo sent a total of 37 petitions to former president Alvaro Uribe, without ever getting a response.​[51]​ The media also showed some signs of preparation of false criminal complaints against Father Javier Giraldo. On October 7, 2008, the television channel Noticias Uno presented a recording of a phone conversation between retired General Rito Alejo Del Río and former Minister of Justice and of Internal Affairs Fernando Londono Hoyos. In this conversation, they discussed how the Inter-Church Justice and Peace Commission (CIJP), of which Father Javier Giraldo is one of the founding fathers, could be discredited. The conversation shows the connection between public stigmatization and criminal prosecution, and it also shows that government officials and army generals use criminal prosecutions as a strategy to silence human rights defenders (Hudson 2009:8). Paradoxically, after the warrant and the appearance of graffiti painting with death threats against Father Javier Giraldo on various walls in Bogotá, the Ministry of Internal Affairs offered him official protection, in recognition of his dangerous work. The protection program consisted of physical protective measures such as phones, bodyguards and even bulletproof cars. Obviously, Father Javier Giraldo rejected this offer, since for him it does not make sense to accept protection from the same state institutions that see him as 'the enemy' and falsely accuse him of slander and defamation.​[52]​ Another human rights defender, Claudia Julieta Duque, did accept the offer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and discovered that it only increased threats. According to her, the protection program is part of a government strategy to obtain information about human rights defenders under the pretext of protection.​[53]​  
	It is remarkable to see how the two opposing parties, the Colombian government and human rights defenders, use almost exactly the same discourse to discredit each other. They accuse each other of slander, defamation and of presenting lies as the truth. Paradoxically, the content of their stories is completely different, but at the same time they are using the same sort of accusations and wordings. In 2006, Fernando Vargas, director of the National Committee for Guerrilla victims, published a book entitled Peace communities: strategy of war. He argues that the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó is a neo-communist community in which people are indoctrinated with subversive ideologies and where children are abused and forced to work. He argues that the Peace Community is a war strategy of guerrilla sympathizers to discredit the armed forces and to falsely accuse soldiers of human rights violations. Again, testimonies of ex-guerrilla's are used to support this argument, such as a testimony of Elkin Dario Tuberquia who, according to Vargas, voluntarily deserted the guerrilla and testified that it was the FARC that was responsible for the massacres of 2005 and not the Colombian army. He also testified that the peace communities had close ties with the FARC (Vargas 2006:13-225).
	Father Javier Giraldo, however, tells a completely different story. According to him Elkin was a poor civilian living in the hamlet Las Nieves in the area of the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. He used to work as a miliciano (informant of the guerrilla) twelve years ago and already served his sentence in prison. Father Javier Giraldo writes in the article in which he explains his moral impediment to cooperate with the Colombian justice system, that Elkin personally confessed to him that he was tortured by a military commander in March 2004 and was forced to cooperate with him, because otherwise he would be assassinated (Giraldo 2009:28-30). He was forced to confess that the large amounts of cacoa in the Peace Community were produced for the guerrilla. Furthermore, he was forced to declare that he was a guerrilla soldier and to state that in San Josecito de Apartadó the guerrilla was present. After some months, the massacre of 2005 occurred and Elkin suddenly proclaimed in the mass media that the FARC perpetrated this massacre, because Luis Eduardo Guerra was a guerrilla soldier who wanted to desert. In order to prevent this, the FARC assassinated him, according to Elkin, who was presented as a demobilized guerrilla soldier. It should be noted, however, that there currently is a legal procedure going on in which ten soldiers are accused of participation in the massacre. Some admitted to their responsibility and one captain was already sentenced to twenty years in prison for his participation in the massacre.​[54]​ Father Javier Giraldo was not surprised to hear Elkin say things like that, because he was aware of the story behind Elkin's statements. Nevertheless, is it unlikely that someone who listens to these stories on the radio will not believe these statements. According to Father Javier Giraldo, the public opinion seems to be manipulated by testimonies obtained by force and torture. Again, the Colombian army uses the same strategy to discredit the community and accuse Peace Community leaders of being guerrilla commanders. The only difference is that now the moral consciousness of innocent civilians is broken down in order to make the strategy effective (ibid). 
	By contrasting these different versions of the same case, it becomes clear how both actors in fact use the same ‘stigmatizing’ discourse to reveal ‘the truth’. Both the Colombian state, as well as human rights defenders and Peace Community members are reified and represented as if there were no differences or blurred lines within these categories. ‘Us’ versus ‘them’ thinking increases the already strong political polarization in Colombia. Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the Colombian state is not a unitary actor in which every public official accuses human rights defenders of being subversive. There are numerous prosecutors, judges and other public officials who try to reject unjustified prosecutions of human rights defenders whenever they can. It also should be noted that some human rights defenders used to view guerrilla violence as legitimate. Still, the line between activists and guerrilla sympathizers is not always that clear-cut.    
Impact of stigmatization on the everyday life of Peace Community members

The climate of extreme political polarization and stigmatization has a strong impact on the everyday life of Peace Community members. First of all, most leaders of the Peace Community are almost always accompanied by NGOs such as Peace Brigades International, Fellowship of Reconciliation and Palomas de Paz when they travel to the city of Apartadó or elsewhere. Since they are seen by the public as collaborating with or being part of the FARC, these leaders run a high risk of being assassinated by paramilitaries who think it is legitimate to kill guerrilla sympathizers. Especially one important Peace Community leader has been threatened various times during the past few years. For example on November first in 2008, he was standing at the door of an internet cafe in Apartadó when two well known paramilitaries approached him. One of them pulled out a gun and pointed it to the leader’s head, while saying he was going to kill him. Immediately, the leader took the hand of the paramilitary in which he was holding the gun, pushed him away and entered the internet cafe. Inside, there was someone from the German community Tamera that supports the Peace Community, and he could hide in there. The paramilitaries were not able to find him, took his bag and left​[55]​. 
	This is only one example of the many threats Peace Community leaders have to face. Consequently, this climate of fear and death threats creates distrust among the Peace Community members. Some are afraid to even leave the community and have not been to Apartadó or other cities for many years. Others are silent and shy and avoid talking to strangers about sensitive topics.  “We must be careful not to provide information about the Peace Community to people living in the area, you cannot talk openly to a random person.” Some civilians living in the area, who are not part of the Peace Community but are considering to join the community, also have doubts about the neutrality of the community and think it is financed by the FARC.​[56]​ Furthermore, Peace Community leaders and NGO workers from Peace Brigades International talk in a kind of ‘secret language’ on the phone in which they avoid the mention of places, names and times, since there is a high probability that phones of Peace Community members are bugged.  
	Another consequence of stigmatization is the lack of good medical attention. For example, a leader living in a more distant hamlet, an eight hour walk from San Josecito, was shot in his leg in 2001 during a confrontation between the armed groups in the region. He had to hide in the mountains, because his house was burned down and there was a lot of violence. He needed medical attention, but nobody wanted to transport him to a nearby hospital, because they were afraid to carry a possible guerrillero. After a few days, he managed to reach a hospital, but, once again, people were suspicious of him. Outside, there were policemen and soldiers who accused him of being a guerrillero. His leg did not heal properly and after nine years he still has a lot of pain and difficulties working his land.​[57]​
	It is common practice to detain Peace Community members of San Josecito de Apartadó illegally. Normally, they are released after a couple of hours and interrogations, due to pressure from international NGOs.​[58]​ In one case, however, a Peace Community member was in jail for eight months, because she was falsely accused of carrying explosives in a cardboard box. This was set up by paramilitaries, in cooperation with the Colombian army, as a paramilitary leader testified in the office of the United Nations in Bogotá (Noche y Niebla 2005:29). Paramilitaries placed a cardboard box with explosives in the public transport jeep that runs from Apartadó to San Josecito. The aim was to kill a few leaders of the Peace Community who were planning to take this jeep, including the Peace Community member who was accused of carrying the explosives. The driver noticed something strange and decided to leave earlier than planned. As a result, the jeep had already passed the location where the paramilitaries wanted to commit the ‘selective’ killings. They called the military to inform them about where they had put the cardboard box with the explosives. Consequently, soldiers converted the plan into a legal procedure and detained all passengers at the military roadblock. Supposedly, they found a paper in the cardboard box with the name of the Peace Community member and other names of guerrilla soldiers on it, including Samir. Although they did not find any fingerprints of the Peace Community member on the cardboard box, she was sent to jail for eights months​[59]​. 




The collective identity of the Peace Community (as explained in detail in chapter four) serves as an overall mechanism to cope with the stigmatization and the impact it has on their daily lives. Their collective identity is reflected in a counter-discourse that challenges the mainstream images of the nature of the conflict in Colombia by the Colombian government. The counter-discourse refers to a critical stance towards and lack of trust in the Colombian government. Peace Community members are convinced that state officials participate in the stigmatization of the community and that soldiers participate in killings of Community leaders. Therefore, they have decided to work independently from any government institution. They position their values in sharp contrast with those of the Colombian government. The Peace Community promotes life and a non-violent way of living, while in their view the Colombian government promotes death and the use of arms. In practice, this counter-discourse is reflected in the creation of their own institutions, in which it is developed and internalized by children and youth living in the community. For example, the education system of the Peace Community is an autonomous institution, independent from the state, with teachers from the Peace Community itself. The curriculum differs from the regular education system in Colombia and focuses on the principles and ideology of the Peace Community. Besides the basic skills in mathematics, writing and reading, children learn the essential 'peasant skills'. Related to this alternative education system is the peasant university that is created for the purpose of sharing ideas about non-violent resistance with other peace communities in Colombia. The university is not located in one particular place, but rotates between the different communities in resistance. From 2004, they have been organizing events and meetings reflected in the idea of an alternative university. The idea of this peasant university contrasts with the official education system, which from the point of view of the Peace Community generates class differences and exclusion. Science and knowledge are commodities that only serve capitalism and consumption. Education in the peasant university is completely dedicated to the knowledge of resistance, the idea of solidarity and the rights of peasants (Noche y niebla 2005:25). Apart from this peasant university, they also organize internal meetings to reflect on the principles of the Peace Community and to convince the youth in the community of the importance of applying these principles. During a couple of days young people from all hamlets that belong to the Peace Community travel to Mulatos (the central meeting place) to participate in working groups, to carry out tasks and to reflect on their motivations and aspirations as members of the Peace Community. They are encouraged to choose a sector such as education, health or culture, in which they can develop themselves as adults and as possible future community leaders​[60]​.   
Besides the educational work of the community that is designed to cope with the stigmatization and the violence, the Peace Community also promotes creativity, in order to come to terms with the loss of close family members or children. One of the mayor promoters of creativity as a coping mechanism is a female Peace Community member who dedicates her life to painting and designing bracelets. Her paintings often display the Peace Community surroundings, with armed people in them. She once told to me: “Designing bracelets is like therapy, much better than the therapy of a psychologist.”​[61]​ She teaches children (but also international volunteers) how to paint and how to design these bracelets. Furthermore, her paintings are being exported to Europe and put on display in expositions. The Peace Community also has a community song which was composed by a leader, one of the founding fathers of the Peace Community, who was assassinated in 1999. This song expresses the reality of living in a violent context and provides the people with faith to continue their resistance.​[62]​
	The Peace Community also created a communication strategy to spread and promote their counter-discourse internationally. They have made several documentaries about the atrocities committed by paramilitaries in cooperation with the Colombian army such as 'hasta la ultima piedra' (until the last stone). This title refers to the memorial monument they designed, which consists of colored stones with the names of assassinated leaders. The title symbolizes their persistence in continuing with non-violent resistance until the last leader is killed. Moreover, they have a website where they publish all killings, threats and examples of stigmatization.
	Finally, their most important survival strategy is international accompaniment and international recognition and solidarity. They bring cases before the Inter American Commission of Human Rights, which several times urged the Colombian government to provide better protection measures for the Peace Community​[63]​. Furthermore, the international presence of NGO workers, who accompany community leaders, is essential for the continuation of their alternative way of life. Through this international accompaniment they are able to show the international community that they work in a transparent way and that they have no connections with the FARC. By living in the Peace Community, NGO workers prove that the community's most important principle is neutrality and that it is not in its interest to support the FARC.
Conclusion

As was argued before, stigmatization is a complex phenomenon, being a non-violent strategy that paradoxically legitimizes violence. This chapter makes clear that this is particularly the case in the context of the Peace Commuity of San José de Apartado. There is no doubt however, that the concept of stigmatization as defined by Link & Phelan is applicable in the case of the Peace Community to answer the question how and to what extent the Peace Community is stigmatized by armed actors and what impact stigmatization has on the everyday lives and on the coping mechanisms of Peace Community members. The essential elements (labeling, stereotyping, separation, status loss, and discrimination) all have an effect in the complex interaction between both parties. At the same time an important element in terms of the effects of stigmatization is lacking in Link & Phelan’s definition. Since polarization is one of the main consequences of stigmatization, incorporating this concept in the definition would make it more complete, as will be underlined below, taking all the necessary elements of stigmatization into account.
	Colombia’s former president Uribe accused Peace Community members on national television of collaborating with the FARC, implying that Peace Community members are in an indirect way, by the highest authority of the Colombian state, labeled as terrorists, or people who protect and cooperate with terrorists. Terrorists have a stereotypical image of being dangerous, evil or inhuman. This image results in the creation of an enemy and in the legitimization of the elimination of this enemy that is perceived as a threat for all other human beings. Violence is thus legitimized and results in the separation of Peace Community members from the rest of the outside world. Many members do not leave the Peace Community territory, because they fear the outside world in which one could be easily killed for being accused of supporting the guerrilla. The separation is also evident in the fact that they have created their own education system and anti-capitalist discourse. Furthermore, due to the ‘enemy discourse’ used by the Colombian government, Peace Community members feel discriminated, as if their rights are taken from them, only because they resist against violence and take a critical stance towards the Colombian government. According to Peace Community members, discrimination occurs when they need medical treatment. They encounter difficulties with finding transport or with getting the right specialist or medicines they need, because they are labeled as guerrilleros. Sometimes they need to go to another hospital in Medellin because there are more facilities and specialists. The procedure goes so slowly, however, that Peace Community members sometimes die because medical treatment came too late. As a result of this discrimination, the interaction between Colombian state actors and Peace Community members polarizes. Peace Community members develop more distrust towards state institutions and also label the state as evil and inhuman. Us versus them thinking works as a coping mechanism and strengthens their group identity. 
	Status loss is ambiguous in the case of the Peace Community. On the one hand do they experience status loss, because stigmatization occurs in the media and influences public opinion easily, partly due to the popularity of Alvaro Uribe. For example some peasants who live in the region and are considering joining the Peace Community, think the Peace Community is financed by the FARC. Also many people living in the nearby city Apartadó, perceive the Peace Community as a dangerous place. People are easily convinced that Peace Community members are not neutral, but instead guerrilla supporters, because they hear stories on the radio of Samir in which he affirms this rumor. On the other hand however this loss of status is not absolute, as in the case of total loss of status the Peace Community might have already ceased to exist. Due to much international support, peace prizes or nominations as well as protection of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, they gain legitimacy.
	It can be concluded that the definition of stigmatization can be applied to the case of the Peace Community. The concept of polarization should be added to the definition, since polarization is one of the main consequences of stigmatization. Furthermore it is clear that stigmatization occurs in the case of the Peace Community because power is exercised. According to the Peace Community, the state is exerting power by using stigmatization as a weapon of war. This process is enabled by the labeling of Peace Community members, by legitimization of violence and by the lack of an independent, objective justice system in which the use of only one witness such as Samir would not be allowed. 























Chapter 6: Discussion and conclusion

Discussion of theory and research findings

This thesis aims at explaining the implications of non-violent resistance in the context of the Colombian Peace Community of San Josecito de Apartadó by emphasizing the interrelatedness of violence and non-violence and using concepts of power and rationality, as introduced by Megan Gilgan in her renewed analytic framework to study non-violent resistance. Gilgan made an attempt to relate theories emphasizing the functions of violence and non-violent resistance theories. In doing so, more emphasis was put on local forms of resistance and on the agency of people who choose not to resort to violence (Gilgan 2001:1-18). However, she did not incorporate the implications of non-violent resistance, such as stigmatization, in her analysis. Consequently, the interrelatedness of violence and non-violence is not sufficiently elaborated. This thesis aims at filling this gap and adds an understudied dimension to Gilgan's rationality of resistance approach.
	The meaning of interrelatedness of violence and non-violence has been illustrated in this thesis by presenting empirical data, obtained during a period of three months of fieldwork in the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. First of all, the interrelatedness of violence and non-violence is evident, because of the existence of a Peace Community in the context of a war zone, which results in complicated interactions between violent and non-violent actors. Secondly, the lines between violence and non-violence cannot be strictly drawn, but have become blurred in some cases. It is common, for example, that Peace Community members have family members in one of the armed groups. This increases the risk of connections and information circulating between armed actors and Peace Community members. This in turn complicates the Peace Community process, because the neutrality principle could be more easily violated. Other examples of blurred lines between violence and non-violence are former guerrilla commanders who are converted into 'peacemakers' by the Colombian government. Furthermore, there are cases of Peace Community members who stop participating in the peace community process, leave the community and decide to join an armed group. These cases illustrate the interrelatedness between violence and non-violence in the context of the Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó. Consequently, we need theories and concepts that address and explain this interrelatedness.
Gilgan’s analytic framework for studying non-violent resistance provides a starting point for addressing the interrelatedness between violence and non-violence. The framework is, however, not completely designed to explain all concepts present in the research question, such as stigmatization and coping mechanisms. Therefore, Gilgan’s framework needs to be adapted in order to explain the research findings. In this discussion of theory and research findings I adapt the framework by explaining the implications of non-violent resistance for the Peace Community members of San Josecito de Apartadó, a dimension Gilgan fails to take into account. A positive effect of non-violent resistance is that it serves as a coping mechanism in itself. Non-violent resistance, in the case of the Peace Community, generates a strong collective identity, an anti-state discourse and production of parallel cultural, economic and political institutions. These elements, that enable Peace Community members to cope with violence, are a precondition to continue the non-violent resistance. Another implication is that non-violent resistance attracts stigmatization. The Peace Community is perceived by its opponents as undermining the status quo or the powerful position that armed actors and state representatives have acquired during many years of conflict. In an attempt to adapt Gilgan’s analytic framework, I will connect the concept of stigmatization, the focus of this thesis, to the concepts of power and rationality, which Gilgan uses in her framework. 
	A focus on political stigmatization complements the analytic framework of Gilgan, when both functions of stigmatization, for armed actors and state officials, as well as the consequences of stigmatization for Peace Community members, are analyzed. In so doing, the power and rationality of both actors are taken into account, which is an important condition in Gilgan’s framework to be able to relate theories which emphasize the functions of violence with non-violent resistance theories. In other words, both actors have the power to come into action and act rationally, for example by labeling, and by using discourses that serve their interests. Stigmatization is functional for armed actors and some state officials, because the strategy of stigmatization is in itself non-violent and thus effective in hiding the fact that it is actually being used as a (non-violent) weapon of war. At the same time, it instigates violence, but does so in a silenced way. Peace Community members bring their victim identity to the forefront, for example, not only because they feel victims and are traumatized, but also because a victim identity is beneficial for them: it attracts international attention and support. Furthermore, Peace Community members resist armed confrontation of powerful actors, without leaving the conflict area and without being passive victims. Instead, they actively organize an alternative way of living and develop a specific identity, ideology and counter discourse. This refers to the agency of Peace Community members that is also reflected in their choice to disrupt dialogue with the government, their work mentality, anti-capitalist sentiments, their autonomy and effective survival strategies and coping mechanisms. For the Peace Community members, non-violent resistance and strong group identity are effective and even necessary means to cope with violence. Due to this active non-violent resistance, complaints and opposition, armed actors need to 'invent' other strategies to maintain their power, to avoid international denunciation. The other strategy is non-violent: a form of stigmatization that seems to be effective in the context of Colombia, where the judiciary is not independent, but often benefits state discourse and interests. Paradoxically, these non-violent strategies, such as labeling, the use of an exclusionist enemy discourse and black and white thinking of both Peace Community members and the Colombian state, increase political polarization and stigmatization and result in an intensification of conflict. It should be mentioned that (now former) president Alvaro Uribe was very popular in Colombia and many people did not question the functioning of the legal system, the militaristic approach and the discourse in which the violent conflict was negated. Actors who participate in stigmatization are able to falsely accuse human rights defenders and Peace Community members, in order to legitimize violence and silence opposition. Furthermore, the discourse of the Colombian government that there is no conflict at all, is also functional, because it means that the Colombian government does not have the responsibility to achieve peace and protect the civil population. Consequently, the feeling of distrust towards state institutions grows in the Peace Community, as well as the need to resist it by increasing the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’. This reaction is, however, understandable considering the number of killings of important leaders, threats and stigmatization the Peace Community members have experienced. In other words, the aim here is not to dismiss or condemn the non-violent resistance process of the Peace Community, but rather to point out that in reality things are not as black and white as presented by the Colombian state and Peace Community members. The state is not a unitary actor. The functioning of the state depends on its institutions, individuals and on their possibilities to be critical and to change certain malpractices.   









Since political stigmatization is an obviously understudied concept in the literature about the Colombian Peace Community San Josecito de Apartadó, I chose to focus my research and data collection on this concept and discovered that there was neither much attention paid to the blurred lines between violence and non-violence, due to a lack of emphasis on political stigmatization. Therefore, the research question was as follows: 

How do the Peace Community members of San Josecito de Apartadó experience the political stigmatization that they are part of or collaborate with the FARC? How does this stigmatization affect their everyday lives and coping mechanisms of non-violent resistance to violence? 

In line with Link and Phelan (2001), I have argued that stigmatization is a process of labeling and stereotyping which results in separation, status loss and discrimination, in order to exert power over a perceived enemy in a violent conflict.
	The Peace Community members experience stigmatization as a serious attempt of the Colombian government to silence and finally eliminate them. Peace Community members promoting non-violent resistance are perceived as people who undermine the power and hegemonic discourse of the state. There is still a lot of guerrilla activity going on in the region of Urabá and there are also many economic interests which, according to the Peace Community members, are an incentive for the Colombian state to discredit the Peace Community. Only by using the strategy of stigmatization they are able to legitimize the violence. If the paramilitaries, in cooperation with the Colombian army, kill innocent Peace Community members who declared themselves neutral in the conflict, this would immediately provoke national and international protest. If Peace Community members have the reputation of having close connections with the FARC, the paramilitaries, together with the Colombian army, have a strong and legitimate reason to eliminate them. In other words, Peace Community members experience the stigma of cooperating with the FARC as a weapon of war, an attempt by the armed actors and the Colombian state to destroy their image and their non-violent resistance process. Referring back to the theoretical framework in which different types of non-violent resistance are discussed in relation to power, the Peace Community shares characteristics with all three types of non-violent resistance. Firstly, by denouncing and criticizing the Colombian government and army and by refusing to enter into a dialogue with these state institutions if their conditions are not met, the Peace Community attempts to deconstruct the ideology of power and break the rules of hegemonic discourse. Secondly, the Peace Community has created 'competing and alternative patterns of relations and interactions' by rejecting individualism and embracing collectivity. By creating their own education system, principles and participatory political system, they have consciously produced parallel cultural, economic and political institutions, and in doing so, they created space for a new social order. Thirdly, they do not cooperate with the Colombian government (which they perceive as the oppressive system) and actively advocate an anti-state discourse. They have even tried to ally sub-groups within the 'enemy camp' with the Peace Community. For example, by asking unarmed state institutions such as the Ombudsman of Human Rights and Inspector General to be present in the San José town center, and thus cooperate with them. This was, however, before the killings of 2005 occurred, which dramatically intensified the distrust towards state institutions and undermined the idea of cooperation with every human being as part of the unity of humanity. Instead, it intensified non-cooperation and increased ‘us versus them’ thinking and enemy images and discourses.
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DECLARACIÓN RELATIVA A LA COMUNIDAD DE PAZ DE SAN JOSÉ DE APARTADÓ
CONSIDERANDO:
La gravedad de la actual crisis humanitaria y de desplazamiento forzado por la que atraviesa el Corregimiento de San José del Municipio de Apartado, región de Urabá, departamento de Antioquia.
La persistente presencia de actores armados que de manera indiscriminada atacan a la población civil generando graves violaciones a los derechos humanos e infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario.
La necesidad de que la población civil establezca mecanismos frente a los actores armados que desarrollen el Derecho Internacional Humanitario en busca de su propia protección
Que las medidas estatales para el control y judicialización de los actores armados no han impedido ni su crecimiento ni su accionar dejando a las comunidades en un grado máximo de exposición y riesgo. 
Que las acciones de los grupos armados en las zonas rurales han producido grandes desplazamientos de Comunidades campesinas hacia centros urbanos, luego de ser víctimas de ejecuciones fuera de combate, la destrucción y saqueo de bienes y las amenazas de nuevas acciones si no abandonan los territorios.
Que reconociendo la voluntad de la mayoría de los miembros de las comunidades desplazadas del Corregimiento de San José de Apartado, luego de un proceso de consulta interna han decido declararse como: COMUNIDAD DE PAZ DE SAN JOSÉ DE APARTADO.
SAN JOSÉ DE APARTADO - COMUNIDAD DE PAZ
Los miembros de las veredas desplazadas del corregimiento, así como los habitantes que libremente deciden acatar los siguientes artículos que desarrollan y reglamentan la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado:
ARTÍCULO 1.
La comunidad del Corregimiento de San José de Apartado, luego de un amplio proceso de consulta interna y acogiendo la voluntad de la mayoría de sus habitantes ha decidido declararse como Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado, mientras el conflicto interno persista y la guerra continué.
ARTICULO 2.
La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado se define como aquella que hace parte de la población civil campesina, no combatiente y que a pesar del desarrollo de las hostilidades, se protegerá sin distinción alguna de los rigores de la confrontación.
Parágrafo 1. En ningún momento los integrantes de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado podrán ser objeto de violaciones a los Derechos Humanos o de infracciones al Derecho Internacional Humanitario.
Parágrafo 2. Para efectos de la presente declaración se entenderá como Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado:
a.Los habitantes de las diversas veredas y del casco urbano del corregimiento de San José de Apartado, que se han comprometido libremente en dicho proceso.
b.Personas civiles que no participen en las hostilidades que no realicen actividad alguna índole militar durante su estancia en la comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado y que se comprometan con los estatutos y reglamentos de esta comunidad,
c.Personas cuya permanencia sea tran sitoria en la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó, siempre que se comprometan con los estatutos y reglamentos y que se encuentren cobijadas por el estatuto de protección a la población civil.
ARTÍCULO 3.
Las personas que hacen parte de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó no realizarán actividad alguna que tenga relación directa o indirecta con las operaciones militares de ninguno de los actores en conflicto, o con el apoyo táctico o estratégico de los mismos.
Parágrafo 1. Las personas que hacen parte de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se comprometen a no participar directa ni indirectamente en las hostilidades y a cumplir con las siguientes condiciones:
a.Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se abstienen de portar y/o tener armas, municiones o materiales explosivos.
b.Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se abstienen de brindar apoyo logístico a las partes en conflicto.
c.Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se abstienen de acudir a alguna de las partes en conflicto para solucionar problemas internos, personales o familiares.
d.Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se comprometen a participar en los trabajaos comunitarios.
e.Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se comprometen a la no injusticia e impunidad de los hechos.
ARTICULO 4.
La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó tomará todas las medidas oportunas y necesarias para controlar el acceso o tránsito a todas las personas sin derecho a permanecer o movilizarse por los sitios de asentamiento de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 5.
La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se limitará a los habitantes del corregimiento que libremente se hayan acogido al proceso de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó, así como a las áreas de cultivo para su subsistencia y a sus fuentes de abastecimiento de agua y energía. La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó reunirá las condiciones para recepción y alojamiento transitorio de las personas forzadas a desplazarse como consecuencia del conflicto armado interno.
ARTÍCULO 6.
Los lugares donde resida la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó se encontrarán claramente identificados con señales como banderas y vallas ubicadas en la periferia de las zonas y el distintivo será un círculo rojo con un fondo blanco. De igual forma serán distintivos los símbolos que la comunidad vaya acogiendo. Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado portarán un carnet que los acredita como miembros de la misma.
ARTÍCULO 7.
La Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado reconoce la competencia de un Consejo Interno conformado por:
• Siete delegados de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartado quienes deberán ser elegidos regular y oportunamente y posesionados ante la misma, además de un Fiscal que tendrá voz, pero no voto. El Consejo tomará sus decisiones en forma autónoma y en caso de que lo solicite podrá tener la asesoría de:
• Un delegado de ONG nacional.
• Un delegado de la Diócesis de Apartadó.
El Consejo Interno se dará su propio reglamento y podrá tomar decisiones si existe mayoría absoluta, es decir cuatro más uno.
Parágrafo 1. El Consejo Interno cumplirá funciones administrativas y disciplinarias para observar el acatamiento de las obligaciones de los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz consignadas en la presente declaración.
Firmado en SAN JOSÉ DE APARTADO a los 23 días del mes de diciembre de 1997, en fe de lo cual firman los representantes de la comunidad.































Reglamento Interno de la Comunidad de Paz de San José de Apartadó

ARTÍCULO 1.
Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz, manifestan su aceptación y compromiso a la declaratoria y al reglamento de la Comunidad de Paz a través de un documento que será firmado por cada una de las personas que den su aceptación al proceso y sean mayores de 12 años. Los padres o adultos responsables responderán por las acciones de los menores de 12 años.
ARTÍCULO 2.
Las personas de la Comunidad de Paz. comenzarán a ser miembros de dicho proceso cuando el Consejo Interno les haga entrega de manera oficial del carnet, luego de haber firmado o dejado su huella, como muestra de aceptación a dicho proceso. Para esto se requiere:
a. Conocer la declaratoria.
b. No ser parte ni directa ni indirecta del conflicto.
c. Aceptar el reglamento de la Comunidad de Paz.
d. Conservar responsablemente los Signos de la Comunidad de Paz.
e.Comprometerse activamente en el desarrollo del proceso esencialmente en los trabajos comunitarios.
Parágrafo 1. Referente al conocimiento estipulado en el artículo 2 numeral a, se requiere entrar primero en una etapa de formación por espacio de un mes, en la que se tendrán 4 talleres coordinados y organizados por el equipo de formación. Se podrá extender la preparación por un mes si fuera necesario, necesidad vista tanto por la persona que busca entrar o por motivos que plantee el Consejo Interno. Si después de este mes de prórroga la persona no acepta, no tendría los beneficios de la Comunidad de Paz y no será parte del proceso.
Parágrafo 2. Los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz residirán en el corregimiento de San José y en las veredas a donde se retorne.
Parágrafo 3. El Consejo hará visitas a cada familia de forma periódica.
Parágrafo 4. El Consejo hará control interno de los signos de la Comunidad de Paz y de la reglamentación. Portante la pérdida o deterioro de alguno de estos signos o de incumplimientos al reglamento se notificarán al Consejo Interno, encargado de establecer la sanción correspondiente, según la gravedad del caso.
Parágrafo 5. Si algún miembro de la Comunidad de Paz desea abandonar el proceso, lo podrá hacer libremente, luego de notificar al Consejo Interno de su decisión y dejando los signos que se le hubieran entregado.
ARTÍCULO 3.
Cualquier miembro de la Comunidad de Paz que infrinja el artículo 3 de la declaratoria, quedará fuera de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 4.
El paso transitorio o acceso de cualquier persona que no sea de la Comunidad de Paz, deberá ser dialogado con el Consejo Interno de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 5.
Los trabajos comunitarios, para la subsistencia de la Comunidad de Paz, serán de carácter obligatorio para los miembros de la Comunidad de Paz. Dichos trabajos serán programados y supervisados por el Consejo, alguna comisión nombrada desde el Consejo u otro miembro de la Comunidad de Paz nombrado en pleno por la comunidad.
ARTICULO 6.
La Comunidad de Paz acogerá transitoriamente a desplazados, siempre que la comunidad desplazada:
a. Asuma el proceso de admisión a la Comunidad de Paz.
b. Asuma el reglamento de la Comunidad de Paz. Si no lo cumpliera, la Comunidad de Paz no se responsabilizará de acoger a dicha comunidad: el Consejo comunicará esta decisión.
c. Esta comunidad desplazada podrá hacer parte, si lo decide libremente, de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 7.
Se buscarán los medios y los recursos para hacer efectivo el artículo 6 de la declaratoria de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 8.
El Consejo Interno de la Comunidad de Paz, estará compuesto por 8 miembros de la comunidad; Si el Consejo Interno lo desea, contará con la asesoría de un delegado de la Diócesis de Apartado y un delegado de una ONG.
a. El Consejo Interno se someterá a consulta de la Comunidad de Paz cada seis meses, pero mínimo continuarán dos personas que permitan con ello dar continuidad a los programas que se vienen desarrollando.
b. El Consejo Interno se reunirá cada sábado; para tomar decisiones, podrá reunirse en cualquier momento siempre y cuando esté la mayoría absoluta, es decir cuatro más uno.
c. El reglamento será evaluado por toda la Comunidad de Paz cada seis meses; y al frente de dicha evaluación estará el Consejo Interno de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 9.
De acuerdo al parágrafo 1, del artículo 7 de la declaratoria el Consejo Interno deberá:
a. Informar a las instancias que sean necesarias del proceso de la Comunidad de Paz o cualquier otra comunicación que merezca tal carácter, en especial a la comunidad internacional.
b. Impulsar, asumir y observar los programas comunitarios de la Comunidad de Paz.
c. Vigilar y administrar cualquier recurso que llegue a la Comunidad de Paz.
d. Regular, representar y exigir los derechos de la Comunidad de Paz ante las autoridades competentes o ante algún actor armado.
e. Llamar al miembro de la Comunidad de Paz que cometa alguna irregularidad o atentado contra el proceso; este llamado lo hará con el fin de dar solución al problema que se genere. Si la falta se comete por segunda vez, vol verá a llamarle y si se repitiera por tercera vez será excluido de la Comunidad de Paz.
f. Controlar el consumo de alcohol que está prohibido en la Comunidad de Paz. Ante esta falta se llamará tanto al consumidor como al vendedor, aplicándose el numeral dede este artículo.
g. Vigilar el respeto a la declaratoria de la Comunidad de Paz por parte de los actores armados; en caso de violación a ésta, se hará denuncia pública a nivel nacional e
internacional.
Parágrafo 1. Si algún miembro del Consejo Interno incurriera contra la declaratoria o contra el reglamento, recibirá la sanción correspondiente estipulada en el reglamento y además quedará inmediatamente fuera del Consejo.
ARTÍCULO 10.
Si alguno de los actores armados atenta contra los derechos o integridad de un miembro de la Comunidad de Paz, toda la Comunidad de Paz irá a reclamar y responderá por dicho miembro.
ARTÍCULO 11.
No se suministrarán ni venderán artículos de ningún género a ninguno de los actores armados, para aplicar el artículo 3, parágrafo 1 de la declaración de la Comunidad de Paz.
ARTÍCULO 12.
La Comunidad de Paz estará atenta para vigilar y observar cualquier atentado contra su proceso tanto en el casco urbano del corregimiento de San José como en las veredas a la que se retorne.
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